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Preface 
The contemporary disposition toward judgments, particularly value-based or moral 
ones, is hostile. In a postmodern environment no one takes heteronomy or metanarratives 
that can produce principles for judgment seriously. Consequently, no judgments are 
justifiably better than any other. Consider this remarkable example, disturbing both 
because of its content and its source: 
Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is no basis other than 
the individual conscience of the citizen that may serve as a platform for launching moral 
judgments. There is no conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to you 
that the judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments of your conscience 
and vice versa. Many of us necessarily feel strongly and deeply about our moral 
judgments, but they remain only personal moral judgments until some way given the 
sanction of law.; 
The content of this citation is disturbing because it indicates the highest legitimacy belongs 
to laws as executed. No notion of inalienable rights, self-evident truth, or any other sort 
of guide to the law other than the will of the lawmaker. In the end, the law is the ultimate 
judgment, and ifthat law happens to be tyrannicalii, the subjects are, in a very real sense, 
out of luck because any judgment that claims the laws of the tyrant are illegitimate has no 
basis. The source of the above citation is disturbing because the words are from the Chief 
Justice of the United States Supreme Court: William Rehnquist. If Rehnquist is employing 
judicial review from the perspective he articulates, he is interpreting the Constitution and 
giving it meaning in a fashion both arbitrary and uncriticizable. If, ( 1) as Justice Hughes 
said, the Constitution is what the Justices say it isiii; (2) the judgments made by the 
Justices are guided by no privileged principles (i.e., legitimacy of judgments really is the 
advantage of the stronger); and (3) the Constitution serves as the guiding and corralling 
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document for ordinary legislation and human conduct, then a problem exists. Were the 
Justices to say the Constitution allowed tyranny, no recourse is possible for the subjects of 
the United States Government. Rebellion, even if arms became available, would not really 
be a solution to the tyranny because the government instituted after rebellion could claim 
no more legitimacy (because it judgments are no better than the former Supreme Court's; 
they just happen to be law) than the former tyranny. In essence, even with a Constitution, 
without heteronomy or some other standard for judgment, problems loom. 
How does one address this problems (and others, as the "Introduction" will 
describe), particularly if the position which fosters them is true - no external standards do 
exist. Provisionally, the solution is to make the sovereign and subjects believe a 
metanarrative exists, and insure the principles derived from the metanarrative preserve the 
possibility of critique and dissent. 
Humans, as Heidegger claims, are equipmental creatures; they look around for 
stuff to use, and the potential use of things is the source of their meaning. This is an 
'Honors Research Project'. This project uses research authentically - it is equipment and 
will be used to address the problem of modemityiv_ Three thinkers' positions will be 
examined for information on how to address the problem: Plato, St. Thomas Aquinas, and 
Kant. Plato will be examined because Plato's Socrates wrestled with positivism and 
rendered a solution in the form of a 'process'; Socrates, much like modem people, could 
not deny the 'truth' of positivism, but suggests a way of avoiding its problem (i.e., no 
ability to evaluate judgments). Aquinas and Kant will be examined because both offer 
accounts of a law or set of principles that allow criticism of institutions and existing bodies 
of human law, and so provide a model for the belief the sovereign must entertain such that 
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its behavior is not tyrannical. 
The 'saving' belief is actually a conjunction of two beliefs. The first belief is the 
privileging of science. The second belief is that a 'human' level of experience exists, more 
primordial and somehow with more authority than experience conditioned by culture, 
background and beliefs. The 'saving' belief is potentially suitable for institution on 
dynamic infonnation processing systems ( connectionist computers) such that the 
judgments of said machines would be 'human' rather than particular. Whether this is 
possible or not is oflittle significance - all that is necessary is that the sovereign and 'the 
masses' believe it is both possible and realized~ a modern 'noble lie'. 
Clearly, this is an interdisciplinary project. Indeed, without infonnation and 
analytical tools from a multiplicity of disciplines, this project could not be realized. Work 
from the following disciplines is included: Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Political 
Theory, Government, and Cognitive Science. Philosophy allowed awareness of a problem 
in government, but the blend, or subjugation, of science by philosophy is likely the key 
move. 
Introduction 
Humans have intents and interests. For whatever reason, humans do not always 
share the same interests. Indeed, these interests are often competing. If left unregulated, 
attempts to realize these interests would lead to conflict among both individuals and 
groups of interested people. Since humans tend to be passionate about many of their 
interests, conflicts would regularly become violent and whatever social organization 
existed would rapidly degenerate. Fortunately, the attempts to realize interests are not left 
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without regulation. Since the advent of recorded human history some fonn of a state has, 
for the most part, perfonned the government of human conduct such that behaviors are 
socially responsible. 
Though the state perfonns this function in general, the particular manner of 
determining the appropriate conduct has differed from state to state. These differences lie 
in two categories: (I) the source of the laws (e.g. , monarch or democratic assembly); and 
(2) the laws or regulations themselves. The tum from monarchy to democracy and 
republicanism during the enlightenment opened the door to a problem without equal: the 
inability to make judgments across diverse experiences. Though the enlightenment was 
founded on a metanarrative (viz., humans have certain inalienable rights and are the 
ultimate source of legitimate authority), the enlightenment's flowering was accompanied 
by the new science and the empiricist school of philosophy, both of which privileged 
experience as the foundation of human knowledge. In essence, the enlightenment placed 
responsibility for making judgments in the hands of the subjects of those judgments, and 
the new science and philosophy claimed that knowledge, and therefore the warrants for 
governmental judgments, is grounded in experience. Experience, however, varies, as did 
judgments, and no standard based on experience existed to evaluate the judgments. The 
battle was between the enlightenment metanarrative, which made claims that could not be 
grounded on experience but allowed judgments which were not relative, and the scientists 
and empiricists who held one could only know what one has experienced. The 
enlightenment beliefs lost; our time is postmodern - there are no metanarratives and one 
cannot philosophically justify behavioral prescriptions across particular experiential 
backgrounds.v 
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This postmodern inability to justify prescriptions is clearly a time bomb. While 
freedom is abundant, the state has become increasingly more pervasive. In addition, 
though the actions of the state have been subject to criticism by marginal people (e.g. the 
Simpson Criminal Trial), outright and determined criticism against the legitimacy of the 
political system and its prescriptions has not occurred . . . yet. 
The following essay is an attempt to justify philosophically the possibility of a 
'natural law' or prescriptive cross-experiential judgment. To accomplish this task, an 
examination of contemporary relativism and indication of what is wrong with that position 
is necessary at first? Why argue against something if its sound? The second stage is a 
survey of certain key thinkers on law, justice and judgment. Their thoughts will yield clues 
or suggestions about what is needed for a natural law. The third section lays out this 
author's thoughts on how to solve the problem. The final section is objections and replies. 
I 
Relativism is, in a sense, specious. The position that judgments are contingent 
upon the frame of reference from which they are made vi seems accurate at first; however, 
deeper reflection renders it suspect. Yet when compared against its opposite - a natural 
law doctrine - its value is restored. The doctrine of relativism rests upon two foundations : 
historical/anthropological and epistemic. The epistemic ground of relativism signifies that 
humans can know only what they experience. This empiricist tradition began implicitly 
with the very first Ionian philosophers ofMiletus who considered experience the source of 
knowledge and yet accepted the existence of phenomena not experienced if what was 
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experienced made the existence of these unexperienced phenomenon 'necessary'vii. This is 
a very weak form of empiricism and prevailed in various forms viii until the 17th century 
when the British Empiricists (John Locke and David Hume) discarded the doctrine of 
innate ideas and Cartesian Rationalism for pure experience: the truth of a claim requires its 
grounding in sensation. Though Hegel's immanent critique of these empiricists is quite 
correctilt, their basic tenet (viz., one cannot 'know' something which doesn't present itself 
to the senses) persisted; this standard for knowledge is entirely appropriate - how else 
might humans know thingsx? 
The privileging of experience as the source of knowledge (the epistemic basis for 
relativism) is constitutive of relativism in three interrelated ways. The first and most 
obvious reason is that experience is unique to the individual. Though two people may 
perceive the same parachute, for example, their experiences are different because their 
perspective will necessarily be different due the space taken by their bodiesxi, and their 
sensory apparatus will not be the same - some people's vision is inferior to others. This 
first support for relativism is not particularly strong since it is not clear why these small 
differences in spatial perspective and sensory apparatus would make the knowledge gained 
from the experience differ to an extent sufficient for a gap in knowledge large enough to 
condemn prescriptive judgment by one of the individuals. The second reason 
contemporary epistemology promotes relativism is that background and expectations 
affect experience. This is both a devastating argument and a shocking claim: if a person 
from the 12th century saw ajet in the sky, the person might nonchalantly consider the 
object a strange bird because her expectations of such objects don't include 'jet'xii' 
whereas a person familiar with airplanes would recognize the object for what is 'really' is. 
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In other words, both would perceive the same sensation, but would experience different 
things. T. S. Kuhn's celebrated The Structure of Scientific Revolutions harbors a 
remarkable example of this phenomenon. According to Kuhn: 
What a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also upon what his previous 
visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see .... Sir William Herschel's 
discovery of Uranus provides a first example . . . On at least seventeen different 
occasions between 1690 and 1781, a number of astronomers, including several of 
Europe' s most eminent observers, had seen a star in positions that we now suppose must 
have been occupied at the time by Uranus. One of the best observers in this group had 
actually seen the star on four successive nights in 1769 without noting the motion that 
could have suggested another identification. Herschel, when he first observed the same 
object twelve years later, did so with a much improved telescope of his own 
manufacture. As a result, he was able to notice an apparent disk-size that was at least 
uncommon for stars. Something was awry, and he therefore postponed identification 
pending further scrutiny. That scrutiny disclosed Uranus' motion among the stars, and 
Herschel announced that he had found a new comet! Only several months later, after 
fruitless attempts to fit the observed motion to a cometary orbit, did Lexell suggest that 
the orbit was probably planetary. When that suggestion was accepted, there were several 
fewer stars and one more planet in the world of the professional astronomer. xiii 
Kuhn justifies two claims in that passage, only one of which is important at this time. The 
claim significant to the present argument is that the meaning or interpretation of 
experiences is contingent on expectations developed through training. The notion of 
training is not unique to science; indeed, customs and culture are essentially similar to 
training since they all construct a particular manner of approaching life. The second (and 
related) claim Kuhn makes (which will be important later) is that the actual object of 
sensation of the different scientists (what they saw in the telescope) were sufficiently 
similar to consider the object as the same - they all, in some sense, saw Uranus, but the 
belief they had about what they saw differedxiv. Kuhn's term for the training and 
expectations which affect experience is 'World View'; this term appears in the work of 
other thinkers (e.g., Hannah Arendt) but will be used as Kuhn understood it. 
The final sense in which epistemology buttresses relativism relies heavily on 
culture. In addition to culture's contribution to an individual's 'World View' is culture's 
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tendency to sculpt the preferences of its members. Most conceptions of Natural Law rely 
upon some universal characteristic of humans from which the laws are derived (e.g., 
suffering). Cultures, through the sculpting of judgments about desirability in mates and 
personal qualities, tend to cultivate a certain manifestation of the universal characteristic. 
For example, in the case of the capacity to suffer's constituting a standard against which 
certain rights and rules of conduct are judged certain cultures that defend female genital 
mutilation present a problem. If deeds which lead to human suffering constitute evil, then 
female genital mutilation would, at first, seem obviously wrong, but, because some 
cultures develop traditions and beliefs that either celebrate the suffering, or obviate it, the 
standard is questionable at best. In cultures that celebrate the suffering as a rite of passage 
to womanhood (etc.), the judgment that suffering is an appropriate standard for judgment 
is called into question. In cultures that train the young women to ignore the pain, the 
standard is rendered impotent against genital mutilation because the deed does not cause 
human suffering. Conceptions of natural law that rely on human reason are more difficult 
for this sort of cultural variation to attack because reason is not considered a universal 
human trait; most people would agree that all humans had the potential to think rationally, 
yet few would claim that this potential is realized universally. Precisely because reason is 
not universal, however, begs the question of which person's version of reason is 'correct'. 
In sum, the result of empiricist epistemology (viz., the source of knowledge is 
experience - that which is present to sensory perception is knowable) is relativism because 
(I) the experiences of humans are unique to each individual, (2) the experiences of (and 
therefore knowledge possessed by) individuals are determined by both the sensation itself 
and the background beliefs and expectations - always shaped by culture - of an individual 
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and (3) cultures tend to breed a particular manifestation of supposedly universal qualities. 
The third prong of the argument for epistemic relativism is essentially the second prong 
deepening the disparity between particular groups because particular manifestations of 
traits and ways of thinking are selected for mating (females who do not submit to genital 
mutilation, for example, are generally ostracized) while others are not. If the epistemic 
position is taken to its logical conclusion, extreme skepticism develops; since one does not 
experience external objects, only the sensations that we attribute to the 'action' of external 
objects, the only thing one can know is that there are sensations, not objects. 
The second foundation ofrelativism is history/anthropology. Though certainly not 
unrelated to the epistemic ground for relativism (subsequently referred to as 'epistemic 
skepticism' for ease in comparing the positions), history/anthropology (subsequently 
referred to as 'historicism') weaves the argument in a subtly different way. The argument 
is roughly that because judgments about right and wrong (and nearly everything else) vary 
from historical period to historical period, those judgments must be contingent on a 
particular historical context. This is mildly different from epistemic skepticism because, in 
contrast to the epistemic argument that suggests that experiential contexts are determinate 
for knowledge, historicism indicates that historical contexts in particular determine 
judgments; not knowledge per se. Historicism is somewhat less relativistic than epistemic 
skepticism because judgments can at least be made during historical contexts, if not across 
them. 
While historicism allows the construction of metanarratives during a particular 
historical context, a phenomenological account of Being results in what Leo Strauss labels 
'Radical Historicism'.icv This label is something of a misnomer, a more accurate label is 
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'Radical Perspectivalism'. This label makes more sense because the phenomenological 
account of Being turns on the notion of 'for-the-sake-of-which', a concept articulated by 
Martin Heidegger in Being and Time. Put crudely, Heidegger's argument is that humans 
(Dasein) always understand themselves as 'being there'. The 'there' is sculpted by mood 
and the 'Understanding'; Heidegger's account of 'Understanding', however, is unique. 
For Heidegger, the 'Understanding' gives ready-to-hand objects their meaning by 
assigning a significance, or 'for-the-sake-of-which'. The significance of things around us 
constitutes a horizon of meaning and possibilities: our potential thoughts and actions are 
limited by the things we notice and fail to notice. The allocations of significance may or 
may not be unique to each individual, Heidegger cannot know because his observation of 
what other Dasein consider significant is always already framed by his perspective or 
horizon.icvi _ Humans (Dasein) understand things (assign significance) relative to their 
orientation, and are always already in a frame of significance (a 'there) when they make 
judgments. Consequently, judgments are relative. 
The various foundations for relativism all foster believable arguments. The 
arguments are not perfect, however. All of the arguments, save Heidegger's 'radical 
perspectivalism' are susceptible to a strong immanent critique. In addition to the 
immanent critique, every argument, even Heidegger's, is subject to a practical problem: 
they lead to social dissolution. 
Provisionally, the immanent critique of epistemic skepticism and historicism is that 
these positions require a relative judgment, but the positions themselves are expressed as 
absolute. In the case of epistemic skepticism, knowledge is due to experienced sensation, 
and sensation is unique to the particular individual. The claim is intuitive and not 
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grounded in experience; no one has ever had an experiencexvii that indicates experience is 
the source of knowledge. The strict standards of experience are too great for the position 
itself to meet. An advocate of empiricism, however, might argue that the only thing 
present to human consciousness is sensationxviii' so any knowledge must be derived from 
sensation. The advocate would likely continue by reaffirming relativism since no 
experience of an objective position or objective knowledge occurs. This restatement is 
not a significant improvement because the claim of subjectivity is only true of the person 
making the claim; while all humans may only be capable of subjective experience, the claim 
that humans are universally subjective represents a statement of objective knowledge. In 
addition, this restatement is largely a version of Heidegger's position: what one can know 
is always already determined by context and the significance of phenomena. Heidegger is 
subject to the same critique that he is subjective and so cannot make universal statements, 
but he never argues he transcends his position (his 'there'). The validity of his claims is 
contingent on the acceptance of his claims by the reader of Being and Time. 
The immanent critique of historicism is largely the same as epistemic skepticism's: 
were one to apply the claim that all thoughts and knowledge are contingent in a particular 
historical context to historicism, the doctrine itself would have to be considered a 
historical phenomenon - intractably linked to its age with no transcendental authority. The 
historicist doctrine could only be true for this particular time, and all prescriptions from it 
would bear the same limitation. 
Immanent critique is only the first of two criticisms of relativism. The second 
criticism bears against relativism generally, as opposed to the particular foundation for a 
relativist position: relativism undermines democratic society. The manner in which 
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relativism accomplishes this is the close linkage between democracy, judgment, consent, 
and legitimacy. Implicit in the concept of democracy is the idea that policies are the 
product of the people subject to them. A consequence of this notion is that no authority 
beyond the people's judgment guides the policies, and these judgments must apply to 
those who make the judgments. Since the people are the ultimate ground of policies and 
no external standard is present, relativism prohibits the construction of a standard. 
Without a standard, the legitimacy of decisions is nil in the eyes of those who disagree 
with the policy. The apologist for 'relativism under democracy' could counter argue that 
democracy is the standard and what the people say is legitimate axiomatically, but this 
response essentially makes the authority of government the justification of government. 
In other words, if a subject of a tyrant questioned the legitimacy of the tyrant's action, the 
response analogous to the apologist's is that the tyrant's will is legitimate because the rule 
is tyranny, and axiomatically legitimate. The apologist of 'relativism under democracy' 
could argue that the rule of the people is legitimate because people are the source of 
sovereignty, whereas a tyranny is not grounded on popular sovereignty. This argument 
fails, however, because the judgment that the people are the source of sovereignty is not 
permissible under relativism; the apologist would have to assume her point to win her 
point. Relativism undermines both the legitimacy of popular sovereignty and the 
judgments produced by that system of government. Other forms of government also 
succumb to a similar problem, but do not privilege the authority of the subjects of 
authority; this distancing of the rule from the rule-maker, while philosophically impotent, 
improves the perception of legitimacy. 
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Relativism breeds problems for the state in terms of coercion as well. If 
judgments are relative, then the coercive power of the state is mitigated in two situations: 
(1) the person/corporationxix denies membership in the society and the authority of the 
state; and (2) the person/corporation agrees that it is a member of the society and subject 
to authority but denies the state's judgment of what it did as wrong. The denial of 
membership undermines the legitimacy of the state's coercive ability if the state's ability to 
act is limited to its own citizens or if consent to the coercive power of the state is 
necessary for coercion. A denial of membership by a person/corporation is a judgment the 
state cannot claim to be incorrect, so the state cannot legitimately coerce the 
person/corporation into 'reacquiring membership'. Were there, however, some sort of 
principle or standard independent of the judgment of people buttressing the state's 
authority, then the state could criticize the denial of membership by the 
person/corporation. In essence, ifthe 'truth' or validity of judgments is relative to 
membership in a group xx then the judgment of whether an individual is a member is itself 
relativexxi, and ifthe ability to coerce is contingent on some sort of membership, then the 
individual could easily disavow membership - and claim to be an ambassador from another 
country, for example. Although such a claim is ludicrous on the surface, how might the 
authorities prove it wrong if no judgment is superior to any other because no standard 
exists against which judgments could be evaluated? 
The other problem with state coercion is more simple: even if the personxxii 
considered itself a member and therefore subject to the state's authority, the 
person/company could still avoid prosecution/compliance. If the state needed some 
reason to exercise its authority (e.g., that a law be broken), then the person/company 
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could deny the reason existed - and its judgment would be equally legitimate. A claim by 
the state that the majority considered the person/corporation guilty, or that some 
mechanism the majority deemed appropriate for rendering judgment (e.g., a jury) 
considered the person guilty should fail for both philosophical and practical reasons. 
Philosophically since the judgment that majority rule is legitimate is suspect; and 
practically because the majority is a potential source of tyranny and should have an 
external guide. 
To take relativism seriously is to condemn the individual to impotence against the 
state for 'evil' deeds and to condemn the state to impotence against the 'evildoers' of 
society. This impotence is a consequence of the equal validity of judgments and the 
requirement of a superior judgment for legitimacy.icxiii Clearly, taking relativism seriously 
would lead to a hasty dissolution of society or eternal tyranny working toward the 
advantage of the stronger (the rulers). Societal dissolution might occur because the sense 
of security necessary for interaction is diminished if the state cannot enforce behavioral 
norms. Tyranny might result because no critique could be lodged against it that is not 
contingent on the interests of individuals (e.g., even freedom) which certain people held. 
If enough people somehow acquired enough power to rebel based on some shared 
interests, the tyranny would remain; once the rebels achieved power, they would continue 
their actions based on interest and use their newly acquired power for realizing those 
interests - either the interests would be selfish, or they would be attempts to foster their 
conception of the 'common good'. The rebels-turned-rulers' conception of the 'common 
good' would not be shared by everyone, and the oppositional view would be equally valid 
and could support another rebellion. In other words, tyranny after tyranny would existxxiv 
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because the guiding principle of action would be solely the motivation of the ruler. 
A potential crisis exists both intellectually and socially. The intellectual crisis is the 
'knowledge' of the impossibility of objective knowledge. No truth, meaning;rnA.ocr, right 
or wrong, good or bad, which is valid beyond the particular individual would be provable. 
The social crisis is the inability to justify preserving a particular set of values or political 
system (e.g., democracy) if subject to an internal rebellion or external foe. In addition, 
society cannot justify coercion of its members who act in destructive ways; positivism's 
theoretical underpinning, relativism, undermines any prescriptive legitimacy of positivism. 
An impotent society collapses into Anarchy. While no one can know how humans might 
behave in Anarchy, the possibility exists for rampant killing, looting, raping, and pillaging. 
While these may or may not be 'bad' in an objective sense, consideration of how to 
absolve this potential crisis is in order. 
II 
Philosophy began in Miletus, a city on the Mediterranean. Miletus was a port city 
which dealt with a great deal of trade; it served Greece, Egypt and Babylon. Thales is the 
Melisian credited with being the first philosopher. Thales' philosophy, however, is 
different from contemporary philosophy: he contemplated the source of things.xxv 
Questions emerge from certain beliefs and often betray those beliefs. For Thales to 
question the source of all things implies the belief that all things have a single source. For 
Thales, the world had an unchanging substance that underpinned and gave coherence to 
experienced reality. Subsequent philosophers also contemplated the source of all things. 
While Thales claimed the source was water, his student and critic, Anaximander, claimed 
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the source was something called 'The Unbounded'. Anaximander disputed Thales' 
solution because he perceived through experience that the elements tended to be in 
opposition to one another""'\ and consequently could not all have come into existence if 
one (water) were primordial.JOCVii This first interplay between philosophers betrays some 
important information about the underlying beliefs and methods of early philosophy: ( 1) all 
things had a single source from which came their nature; (2) experience could produce 
conclusions not immediately present to sensation. Anaximander' s answer to Thales 
emerged from experience (the recognition that elements were in opposition), but his belief 
in a source of all things required something to replace water. The substance couldn't be 
anything experienced because no phenomenon in existence caused other things. This 
combination of belief and a vacuum in experience resulted in an answer claiming the 
existence of a substance not present to experience but necessarily in existence. The 
sophists inherited this belief and method in a peculiar form. The sophists of note (those 
particularly relevant to Plato's work) were Gorgias, Protagoras, and Thrasymachus. All 
three of these sophists came from areas on the outskirts of the Greek world: Protagoras 
from Abdera in Thrace, Gorgias from Leontini in Sicily, and Thrasymachus from 
Chalcedonia, a region southeast of Thrace. These individuals observed a breadth of 
cultures and belief systems but not a variety of natural phenomena; people believed 
different things were right and wrong, but fire was always hot and leaves always grew on 
trees. In essence, things in nature had a certain consistency while human morals and 
beliefs were contingent on the particular regional customs. JOCViii This observation is 
remarkably similar to the argument for cultural relativism grounded in contemporary 
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anthropology. The sophists noticed that while things in nature are consistent across 
different geographical regions (e.g., water runs downhill), the judgments of humans 
differed; people in different regions considered different things right and wrong, 
praiseworthy or punishable. Some sophists reasoned that judgments are necessarily 
contingent on particular experiences and background, rather than some innate 'reason' 
which made some objective right and wrong accessible to consciousness. Though Plato's 
Socrates is considered in opposition to the sophistic practice of accepting payment for 
teaching, Socrates actually spent a good deal of his time arguing against the substance of 
sophistic teaching: turning the weaker argument into the stronger. One cannot turn a 
weak argument into a strong one if an objective principle guides judgmentsxxix; sophistry is 
only possible if the value of a position is relative to the desires and experiences of the 
person one is attempting to persuade. Consequently, Socrates was both aware of and 
argued against relativism. Toward the end of finding a solution to the postmodern crisis, 
an examination of Plato's work is in order; Plato was the first philosopher of note to 
wrestle with relativism. The information sought from Plato falls into two categories: (1) 
the relationship between knowledge and judgment; and (2) the relationship between 
judgment and prescription by the state. 
Interpretation of Plato across different dialogues is something of a suspect 
endeavor: the context of each dialogue affects the meaning of the speech, and the 
metaphors used in each particular dialogue do not necessarily correspond with other 
dialogues. xxx Consequently, a single platonic dialogue will be examined, with occasional 
notes indicating a few cross-references. The dialogue that concerns the issues of 
knowledge, judgment and the state most intently is the Republic. xxxi Since the notions of 
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relativism and positivism were not completely foreign to Plato, careful attention must be 
paid to passages where these 'modern' arguments are advanced and Socrates engages 
them in dialogue. 
Plato's Republic 
I declare he bears a strong resemblance to those figures of Silenus in statuaries' shops, 
represented holding pipes or flutes; they are hollowing inside, and when they are taken 
apart you see they contain little figures of gods. 
-Alcibiades describing Socrates in The 
Symposium=;; 
The Republic opens in a very curious fashion: Socrates is speaking to an 
unidentified person, perhaps even himself, about some events that occurred the day 
before.'°°°ii No commentator seems to find this disturbing; it receives no explicit attention, 
however this beginning is potentially significant. Firstly, the anonymity of the listener of 
Socrates suggests that the particularity of the listener is not important for Plato in this 
dialogue- in other words, Socrates' story is suitable for all audiences. To be suitable for 
all audiences suggests that the material has meaning and significance (not necessarily the 
same meaning) for anyone who reads it and that the manner in which it is presented is 
'human' rather than contingent on a particular context, social status or educational 
background. The entire argument must be present in the dialogue itself, otherwise some 
definition of the audience would be necessary such that the presuppositions required for 
comprehension would be accessible to the reader.'°°°v This also suggests that the issues 
are significant for humans generally. Secondly, the single voice indicates the piece is a 
dialogue in a monologue. A story. A story of what happened yesterday. A tale, which at 
the outset does not present itself obviously as a tale but which is explicitly considered a 
tale at the end. xxxv The alpha is implicit, the omega explicit but different - partially because 
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the beginning comes after the end: the events took place yesterday. Additionally, a 
monologue of this sort often is a parable that has an ostensible meaning and a 
metaphorical meaning. What Plato does not say explicitly at the beginning gives the 
careful reader a great deal ofinsight into the nature of the piece which follows . 
"Book I" of the Republic introduces the views on justice of four people. The 
positive claims of Cephalus, Polemarchus, and Thrasymachus are constitutive of three of 
those conceptions. Socrates' view on justice is at least partially revealed in the arguments 
lodged against the three positive claims; the requirements he places on a conception of 
justice must be met by his own articulation. By understanding the necessary conditions 
that Socrates imposes on a notion of justice, one can obtain a provisional understanding of 
his views on justice. Therefore close attention must be paid to the necessary 
consequences of Socrates' arguments refuting the other three conceptions. The necessity 
of a conception of justice - how it interacts with the relationships between knowledge, 
judgment, and authority - will become clear as the arguments are examined. 
The first claim about justice is from Cephalus. Cephalus (literally, the name is 
'Head'xxxvi - a position of authority) is an aged, pious, and wealthy man. Cephalus bids 
Socrates a greeting and, in perhaps a conceitJOCXVii' asks Socrates to talk with the young 
people around him. Socrates implicitly declines and claims he delights in talking with the 
aged - they have experience the youth do not, and so can inform others about what its like 
to have reached an advanced stage oflife. Socrates recognizes the disparity of 
perspectives and knowledge based on experience, and suggests that Cephalus' perspective 
and experience are helpful for a judgment about whether being aged is a easy or hard time 
of life. 
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In the course of telling about what its like to be aged and why he is not particularly 
unhappy about it, Cephalus mentions wealth as a contributing reason. The wealth is useful 
because it allows Cephalus to reconcile his debts to the gods and fellow men, and it helps 
him to avoid lying, cheating, and acquiring debts in the first place. Cephalus is correcting 
what he considers unjust deeds by attempting to repair the damage. This is not necessarily 
justice, however, because the just man would probably not have incurred the obligations in 
the first place; Cephalus' view articulates the struggle to become just. Under this view, 
giving what someone is due at the time it is due, rather than giving back later in life what 
one has taken from someone earlier, would be just. Socrates ignores this distinction at 
first and labels (1) reckoning of one's debts (giving back what one has taken) and (2) 
telling the truth, as acting justly and proceeds to engage Cephalus in dialogue. xxxviii The 
question Socrates raises is whether giving back what has been taken or telling the truth is 
always just. Cephalus concedes that sometimes these actions are unjust. The question 
Socrates asks betrays something about what he considers just: not always giving what one 
has taken and not always telling the truth is just - what is missing is an account of the 
conditions under which these behaviors are appropriate (just) and when their opposites are 
appropriate. 
Cephalus is aged - the voice of establishment and the head of a household. He 
represents tradition, and just like tradition itself, his argument gets handed down and 
carried out by the subsequent generation viz., Polemarchus. By altering the argument of 
Polemarchus, Socrates is acting out the philosophical enterprise of critique and 
immanently showing to the reader of the Republic that persuasion of tradition is possible. 
The manner in which Cephalus' opinion was criticized did not appeal to an external source 
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- it merely called for internal consistency. The manner in which the alteration, or 
abandonment, of tradition occurs (through Polemarchus) deserves attention because if 
Socrates appeals to some external standard that may indicate his position on whether that 
is the way in which political systems should be critiqued. If Socrates does something else, 
that may indicate the external or objective standard has yet to be discovered and must be 
laid out later or that no standard exists at all. The refutation of Polemarchus will perhaps 
resolve this issue. 
Cephalus leaves the argument on justice to engage in pious acts. The 
representative of tradition's priorities are clear: piety and religious belief over philosophy. 
Polemarchus initially distances himself from the argument (and incorporates another piece 
of tradition) by defending Simonides' claim about justice. Simonides' claim (i.e., give to 
each what is owed) is very similar to Cephalus' and therefore Socrates requests that 
Polemarchus expound on Simonides' maxim such that it becomes clear how it avoids the 
problem of inconsistency present in Cephalus' claim. 
This engages Polemarchus in the dialogue and removes his position from its 
traditional husk - Polemarchus must defend the opinion as an opinion without appealing to 
the prejudicial armor of tradition. Polemarchus substitutes 'what is owed' with 'what is 
fitting' . Socrates displays the problems with this view by constructing an analogy with 
artxxxix The argument by analogy draws Polemarchus into considering that because justice 
is distributive (i.e., it concerns giving out what is fitting: good to friends and bad to 
enemies) it is something of an art. Since the art is used on friends and enemies alike, 
Socrates points out that it seems useful only during times of conflict when enemies exist. 
Socrates therefore turns the argument from what just people do to how justice is useful. 
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This turn of the argument does not persuade Polemarchus to reconsider his position; 
rather, he asserts that just people are useful in times of peace for contracts and 
partnerships. Socrates persuades Polemarchus that this position does not advance the 
discussion since the just person is only useful in contracts while the things contracted are 
not in use; if, however, something is used or traded, someone with expertise or knowledge 
of the item to be used or traded is useful, while the just person is not. At this point 
Polemarchus is exasperated; he concedes he does not know what he means but still holds 
the opinion that justice is helping fiiends and harming enemies. Polemarchus is still not 
persuaded. 
Socrates finally entices Polemarchus away from his opinion by suggesting that 
since ( 1) harming someone makes the person less just, (2) justice is a human virtue, and 
(3) acting virtuously does not decrease virtue in those on which one acts, the just person 
never harms anyone. A careful examination of how Socrates constructs the argument 
provides insight into how one criticizes judgment: he does not appeal to a principle 
external to the beliefs of Polemarchus, instead he persuades Polemarchus by indicating 
how his own belief (engaging in virtuous activity does not decrease the virtue of the 
subject of that action) is inconsistent with another (his initial opinion on justice). 
Unfortunately, this approach offers little insight into why one belief is privileged 
over another: Polemarchus could have chosen to give up his belief in virtue.xi The 
structure of the dialectic is probably responsible for Polemarchus' choice. This is so 
because Socrates' presentation of the fact that the beliefs in virtue and justice were in 
conflict does not occur until after the belief in virtue had been identified as an axiom and 
the belief in justice place the object of the debate and whose certainty was questionable. 
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In other words, Socrates hid the belief in virtue in the dialectic such that it did not appear 
as a belief but as an axiom, and subjected the belief injustice to that axiom. If Socrates' 
solution to conflicting value judgments viz., between the values of virtue and justice, is 
that the judgment is conditional on the circumstance or frame of the question, then the 
crisis in judgment faced by modernity seems to receive no solution from Socrates. 
A distillation of the manner in which Polemarchus is persuaded is as follows. 
Polemarchus, the heir of tradition, is wrested from the traditional opinion by philosophy 
through two rhetorical moves. The first rhetorical move Socrates made was to require 
Polemarchus to restate Simonides' position; this restatement made Polemarchus identify 
the position as his own voice and think more independently. Socrates followed this move 
by placing the belief he wanted to remain (Polemarchus' view of virtue) in the dialectic as 
a secure position relative to Polemarchus' opinion of justice. In a sense, philosophy uses 
the dialectic and rhetoric to achieve a certain end. That end, however is not clear,idi nor is 
it justified in a way that avoids relativism. 
Fortunately, "Book I" is not over and the key position that allows for the 
postmodern judgmental crisis (i.e., positivism) has yet to be articulated. After 
Polemarchus and Socrates come to an agreement on the inadequacy of Polemarchus' 
initial opinion on the just, the two begin discussing how they are united against that former 
traditional view of justice. At this point, before Socrates and Polemarchus' new 
cooperative spirit can bear fruit by articulating a philosophically acceptable conception of 
justice, Thrasymachus furiousl~ii leaps into the argument. 
At first, Thrasymachus pushes Socrates to speak his opinion of justice rather than 
remain the critic, but does not succeed for reasons explained in endnote 40. 
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Thrasyrnachus finally agrees to speak instead of continuing to cajole Socrates into 
speaking and pronounces that the just is only the advantage of the stronger. xliii For 
Thrasymachus, the rulers are the strong, and the ruled the weak. The rulers make rules for 
their own advantage, and it is just for the ruled to obey these rules. Under this notion of 
justice, no judgment by the people subject to the laws is possible. Consequently, 
philosophy is nearly impossible because it constitutes (or at least enables) criticism of state 
actions and questions tradition, both of these actions are unjust (and therefore punishable) 
under Thrasymachus' notion of justice. Philosophy is only nearly impossible, rather than 
wholly destroyed under positivism, because it has two ways to manifest itself The first is 
to operate in secret, however the act of philosophy would still be unjust, so this is 
somewhat unacceptable. The second way in which philosophy could still operate under a 
notion of justice as advantage of the stronger is if the philosophers were the stronger - if 
the philosopher ruled, then their judgment would be manifest. Unfortunately, 
philosophical rule is somewhat in conflict with the notion of philosophy so far 
demonstrated by Socrates viz., critiquing through the dialectic and avoiding a positive 
accounts of things, because a ruler must advance positions rather than criticize them. 
After Thrasymachus offers his account of justice Socrates begins questioning it and 
claims that since ruling is an art, and arts work toward the benefit of the object of the art 
(in the case of ruling, that is the subjects of the rule), then ruling cannot be to the 
advantage of the stronger, rather it is to the advantage of the weaker. To this argument 
Thrasymachus counters that the art of shepherding, for example, works to the benefit of 
the sheep, but not with their advantage as its goal. In the case of ruling, Thrasymachus' 
argument is that the rule may benefit the ruled, but the laws are not made toward the 
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advantage of the weak.x1iv To this argument Thrasymachus adds that perfect injustice 
(injustice which is so cleverly instituted that it is not perceived as injustice) is more 
profitable than acting just. Socrates shifts away from examining Thrasymachus' claim on 
justice and switches to examining the claim of injustice being more profitable than 
injustice. 
While Socrates succeeds in proving that injustice is less profitable than justice, he 
fails to defeat Thrasymachus' claim that the just is the advantage of the stronger; Socrates 
admits this: 
Before finding out what we were considering at first-what the just is-I let go of that 
and pursued the consideration of whether it was vice and lack of learning, or wisdom 
and virtue. And later, when in its turn an argument that injustice is more profitable 
than justice fell on my way, I could not restrain myself from leaving the other one and 
going after this one, so that now as a result of this discussion I know nothing . So long 
as I do not know what the just is, I shall hardly know whether it is virtue or not and 
whether the one who has it is unhappy, or happy. 
Two important observations must be made about this passage in addition to the failure to 
grapple with Thrasymachus' notion of the just: (1) Socrates demonstrated through his 
dialogue with Polemarchus that he (and philosophy) choose which belief to attack very 
carefully - Socrates chose not to address Thrasymachus' notion of justice; and (2) 
Socrates knows nothing as a result of the argument. This vacuum of knowledge wasn't 
present before - Socrates knows that to concede positivism is to concede that one does 
not know the just (or anything else objective) because if one did, the rule of the stronger 
could be objectionable, and the argument for positivism could be defeated. 
The issue of whether Plato's answer to the crisis of judgment about what is good is 
largely complete: positivism cannot be defeated and therefore no claim to knowledge is 
possible. The warrants for this claim or interpretation are not exhausted. Some very 
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strong evidence for the claim that Plato concedes positivism, but cannot openly do so, is 
found early in "Book II" of the Republic. In "Book II'' Glaucon and Adeimantus take 
up part of Thrasymachus' position: that injustice is better than justice because they believe 
that justice is better than injustice and want Socrates to show them why. If Glaucon and 
Adeimantus articulate the position that injustice is better than justice, then Socrates could 
engage them in dialectic and shift that opinion, viz., injustice is better than justice, to 
knowledge that justice is superior. Socrates does agree to take issue with Glaucon and 
Adeimantus, but with a clever and significant provision: the issue of whether justice is 
better than injustice must be approached from the level of the city. Socrates claims this 
move from individual to city would make things more manageable, but it must be 
significant for another reason since, at the end of"Book I" Socrates conceded that 
without an adequate notion of what the just is, he knows nothing, so cannot really tell 
whether justice is better than injustice. Somehow the examination of justice on the level 
of the city allows Socrates to break through this ignorance. The reason Socrates requires 
examination on the city level is because positivism is true: the just is the decision of the 
stronger, and by discussing justice as founders of the city, Socrates, Glaucon, and 
Adeimantus become the stronger, and thus can say what the just is, at least in their city.xiv 
Since Socrates has conceded that he cannot say what the just is outside the 
confines of positivismxivi, Plato has failed to provide a solution to the crisis of modernity; 
Plato has not left the project empty-handed, however, because Socrates' behavior with 
Polemarchus provides a model for how to avoid the evils of positivism. Although no 
external standard exists, opinions are generally not monolithic (i.e., they contain their own 
negation), so the task of philosophers is to engage opinions that are harmful to philosophy 
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in a dialectic which hides the (no more objectively legitimate) opinion which conflicts with 
the opinion hannful to philosophy. Therefore, in a sense, Plato has both conceded 
positivism and relativism, but has uncovered an intra-systemic process for wrestling with 
the evil consequences of those positions. The articulation of justicexlvii from Socrates' city 
is merely another convention because the underlying assumptions of the regime (e.g., 
justice is salutary) are not privileged in some objective sense; therefore the material from 
Plato's Republic subsequent to the point where Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus 
become the stronger is not integral to this essay. Determining what the belief hidden in 
the dialectic against contemporary belief in relativism might look like is integral, though, 
and that belief must be some sort of 'natural law', or privileged principles. Consequently, 
an examination of the view of an eminent thinker on natural law must be examined. 
Saint Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica 
The Thomistic philosophy cannot, in the eyes of modernity, pretend to supply a 
legitimate foundation for a natural law because of its theological underpinning. It can, 
however, provide a scheme or set of necessary conditions which a natural law must 
possess to function appropriately. In the case of this project, Aquinas can provide a 
structure to the product of the dialectic between the belief in relativism (etc.) and the some 
belief (as yet undiscovered) such that the product can operate as a standard against which 
positive laws are judged. 
Like the portion on Plato, this section on Aquinas will focus on one work: the 
Summa Theologica. The Summa Theologica is a treatise written largely to expound the 
theological views of Aquinas while answering challenges to philosophy and faith by the 
Augustinians and the Latin Averroists, respectively. While Plato hid certain ideas in his 
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text, Aquinas is overt. In addition, Aquinas' philosophical method is something of a 
dialogue, yet character and setting are not considerations - only the 'pure' argument. 
Plato seemed to recognize the significance of context, motivation, and belief on the 
legitimacy of claims and the structure of an argument. Aquinas, in accord with his 
position on the issue of relativismxlviii did not include context, etc. in his argument; the 
actual issue itself is of critical importance. 
The term 'Natural Law' is the product of the two constitutive terms: 'natural' and 
'law' . An explication of Aquinas' position therefore requires an understanding of what he 
means by 'natural' and what he means by 'law'. Nature is the aspect or characteristic of 
an entity which makes a thing be that entity. In "Part I'', "Question 29", "Article 2"xlix' 
Aquinas states: 
According to the Philosopher [Aristotle in the Metaphysics, v, 8 (1017b23).] substance is 
spoken of in two ways. In one sense it means the quiddity of a thing, signified by its 
definition, and thus we say that the definition means the substance of a thing; in this 
sense substance is called by the Greeks oucria., which we may call essence. . . . It 
[substance] is also called by three names signifying a reality-that is. "a thing of 
nature," "subsistence," and "hypostasis," according to a three-fold consideration of the 
substance thus named. For, as it exists in itself and not another, it is called subsistence; 
as we say that those things subsist which exist in themselves, and not in another. As it 
underlies some common nature, it is called a thing of nature; as, for instance, this 
particular man is a human natural thing.1 
Aquinas' explication of 'substance' indicates a close relationship between that term and 
nature; nature has two linked meanings: (1) the essence, or essential and defining 
characteristics of the thing; and (2) a genus of substances which have a common essence 
(e.g., a human natural things as opposed to an angelic divine thing). Instead of 'human 
natural thing', Aquinas could have said 'fox natural thing', since both are substances with 
an underlying essence of the natural type, rather than divine substance. 
This provisional account of nature leaves much unsaid: it begs the questions of (1) 
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what is the underlying essence of humans, and (2) what does it mean to be a natural thing. 
An account of the underlying and defining essence of humans would be particularly useful 
since Aquinas makes claims about a natural law, rather than a law of nature. A clue to 
these questions is found in the first article of the 80th question of "Book I": 
It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must 
observe that some inclination follows every form; for example, fire, by its form, is 
inclined to rise, and to generate its like. Now, the form is found to be more perfect in 
those things which participate in knowledge than those which lack knowledge. For in 
those which lack knowledge, the form is found to determine each thing only to its own 
being -that is, to the being natural to each. Therefore this natural form is followed by 
an natural inclination, which is called a natural appetite. But in those things which 
have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its own natural 
form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things; for 
example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect of all things 
intelligible, and thus the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect. And 
thus those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness of God, "in 
Whom all things pre-exist," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. V). 
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner 
and above the manner of natural forms, so must there be in them an inclination 
surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this 
superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the 
animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by 
its natural form. Ji 
The above citation answers the second questions about Aquinas' view of nature, and lays 
the foundation for the answer to the first. The essence of an entity is the structure of 
inclinations of behavior for its form. So, for humans to be a natural thing (question #2) 
means that they possess inclinations from their form; the human essence has certain 
inclinations and is determined by them. Humans also have the potential to know things 
through sensation and the intellect, however, so share something with the nature of 
divinity. Human knowledge manifests itself in inclinations from the soul. Thus humans 
have natural and semi-divine inclinations. To answer the first question completely, the 
actual inclinations of humans must be determined rather than their general nature. These 
inclinations stem both from what humans apprehend through the intellect and the senses 
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and their status as natural. Aquinas elaborates and indicates what they are in the following 
passage: 
Now a certain order is to be found is those things that are apprehended by man. For 
that which, before anything else falls under apprehension, is being, the understanding of 
which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Therefore the first 
indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the 
same time, . . . Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension 
absolutely, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of practical 
reason, which is directed to action; for every agent acts for an end, which has the aspect 
of good. Consequently the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the 
notion of good, namely, that the good is what all desire. Hence, this is the first precept 
of the [natural] law, that good is to be pursued and done, and evil is to be avoided. All 
other precepts of the natural law are based upon this, . . . 
Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil the nature of a contrary, 
hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination are naturally 
apprehended by reason as being good, and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their 
contraries as evil and objects of avoidance. Therefore the order of the precepts of the 
natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations. Because in man there is 
first of all an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common 
with all substances; that is, every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, 
according to its nature. And by reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of 
preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles belongs to the natural law. 
Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, 
according to that nature which he has in common with other animals. . . . [S]uch as 
sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an 
inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him; 
thus man has an inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society . . .. 
[W]hatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun 
ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things 
regarding the above inclination.1;; 
By nature, humans are inclined to pursue and do good, preserve themselves, and desire 
true and divine knowledge. The recognition of the good is innate and always already 
understood when things are apprehended; the natural is apprehended connaturally. These 
inclinations constitute human essence or nature, and ground the natural law. The 
remaining question concerning Aquinas is what he means by 'law'. 
Aquinas' understanding oflaw has two parts: (1) a description of the law; and (2) 
the 'essence' or 'ordering' of the law, or judgment. The description of the law is fairly 
straightforward. For Aquinas, "Law is a rule or measure acts, by which man is induced to 
act or is restrained from acting[,]" and this rule is guided by a telos know to reason. 
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While these rules or measures are either written, spoken, or both, the essence of the law 
lies behind the spoken and written; laws are dictates, but, for Aquinas, the motivation 
behind them is essential for understanding law. The motivation behind the law is a certain 
purpose determined by the inclinations present in human beings. For example, self-
preservation is one of the inclinations of humans and, under certain circumstances, 
carrying a gun inhibits that inclination. Consequently, law-makers would determine the 
under what circumstances the action (carrying a gun) is harmful (e.g., when the person 
carrying the gun is not trained in its use) to a natural inclination. 
In essence, Aquinas' explanation for the law is that a relationship exists between a 
set of facts (or a condition) and have a purpose or inclination. The natural law constitutes 
that purpose and the law-maker determines which situations place those purposes in 
jeopardy. The judgment of the law maker is then instituted into a command or directive 
judgment. Aquinas is precise in his usage of command, and his understanding should not 
be confused with the expression of the will of the sovereign, in the sense of John Austin1iii . 
Aquinas' comment on the relationship between command and will: 
Command is an act of the reason, presupposing, however, an act of will. In proof of 
this, we must take note that since the acts of the reason and of the will can be brought to 
bear on one another, in so far as the reason reasons about willing and the will wills to 
reason, the result is that the act of reason precedes the act of will, and conversely. . .. 
Now, command is essentially indeed an act of the reason for the commander orders 
the commanded to do something, by way of intimation or declaration, and to order thus 
by an act of intimating or declaring is an act of reason.1iv 
For Aquinas, will and reason can influence on another: one can will to reason and reason 
about will, so a command could be one of these options. Since command is an order to do 
something by way of communication, rather than the execution of the deed, it is an act of 
reason. Will is always already presupposed, however, since the issuance of the command 
Z. May - Honors Thesis 
page 33 of 68. 
requires an intent to issue and because the completion of the command is an act of will. 
While Plato conceded that will is sufficient for legitimacy (judgments about just 
and unjust are relative to the source regime), the Thomistic conception of natural law can 
critique regimes because it contains an internal standard for determining the goodness or 
badness of judgments; Aquinas was quite aware of positivism and even concedes that laws 
grounded on it solely are good, in a sense, but claims that they do not possess the same 
goodness as a law grounded on his natural law standard: 
[A] law is nothing else than a dictate of reason in the ruler, by whom his subjects are 
governed. Now the virtue of a sub-ordinate thing consists in its being well subordinated 
to that by which it is regulated. Thus we see that the virtue of the irascible and 
concupiscible faculties consists in his being well-subjected to his ruler, as the 
Philosopher [Aristotle in the Politics, I, 13 (1260b20)] says. But every law aims at being 
obeyed by those who are subject to it. Consequently it is evident that the proper effect of 
law is to lead its subject to their proper virtue; and since virtue is "that which makes its 
subjects good," it follows that the proper effect oflaw is to make those to whom it is 
given, good, either absolutely or in some particular respect. For if the intention of the 
lawgiver is fixed on true good, which is the common good regulated according to Divine 
justice, it follows that the effect of the law is to make men good absolutely. If, however, 
the intention of the lawgiver is fixed on that which is not good absolutely, but useful and 
pleasurable to himself, in opposition to Divine justice, then the law does not make men 
good absolutely, but relatively, that is, in respect to that particular government. In this 
way good is found even in things that are bad themselves; thus a man is called a good 
robber, because he works in a way that is adapted to his end.1v 
Aquinas, like Plato, grants that good, in the relative sense, is contingent on the particular 
regime issuing the laws. He, unlike Plato, maintains another sense of good exists, the 
absolute, which is contingent on Divine justice and requires that the laws of the regime are 
salutary, among other things; Plato could not maintain that laws should be salutary beyond 
the particular regime in which Glaucon, Adeimantus and Socrates were the stronger. The 
Thomistic formulations' ability to critique, however, is clearly dependent on the notion of 
Divine justice. Indeed, Aquinas' Divine justice itself is a 'positive law' because its 
legitimacy is contingent on the position of God relative to humans - the supremacy God 
provides the authority for natural law to be superior to human positive law: 
.. 
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Now wherever there are movers ordered to one another, the power of the second mover 
has to be derived from the power of the first mover, since the second mover does not 
move except in so far as it is moved by the first. Hence we observe the same in all those 
who govern, so that the plan (ratio) of government is derived by secondary governors 
from the governor in chief; thus the plan of what is to be done in a state flows from the 
king's command to his inferior administrators. And again in things of art the plan of 
whatever is to be done by art flows from the chief craftsman to the under-craftsmen who 
work with their hands. Since then the eternal law is the plan of government in the Chief 
Governor, all the plans of government in the inferior governors must be derived from 
the eternal law. But these plans of inferior governors are all other laws besides the 
eternal law. Therefore all laws, in so far as they partake of right reason, are derived 
from the eternal law.1vi 
At first glance Aquinas appears to be blurring the descriptive with the prescriptive: he 
claims all laws are derivative of the eternal law by definition, yet in the passage from page 
214, he claims that the absolute goodness of a law is relative to the degree to which it 
manifests Divine justice. Therefore, since the law is derived from the good, it is good. 
The solution to this apparent discrepancy is the notion of ' right reason'. While law is a 
product of reason (which presumes an act of will), human reason is not always 'right', so 
the reason which produces law, while a derivative of divine substance, is not perfect. 
Analogously, the product of that reason, human positive law, while derivative of the 
decree from God's superior position: eternal law, is not necessarily perfectly realized. 
One final necessary element of Aquinas' natural law exists. The law must be 
promulgated. Though Aquinas claims the natural law is known connaturally (i.e., it is 
apprehended without the exercise of volition), the human positive law determines which 
conditions could inhibit the realization of natural human inclinations1vii and legislates 
toward that end. Since the human positive law is not known to people innately, it must be 
decreed. In addition, some people do not have right reason, and so require direct 
indication. Finally, obedience to the law is only possible if people know the law. Aquinas 
explains the final reason why promulgation is necessary: 
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[A] law is imposed on others by way of a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is 
imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Therefore, in 
order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must be applied to 
the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to 
them by promulgation. . . . The promulgation that takes place now extends to future 
time by reason of the durability of written characters, by which means it is continually 
promulgated. 
In sum1viii' the Thomistic formulation of natural law turns on four characteristics: 
(1) it is derived from a position superior to human positive law1ix; (2) it is good in an 
absolute sense rather than a particular sense - it addresses humans as humans, rather than 
as members of a particular state - because God is the sovereign; (3) though superior to 
human positive law, it is not independent of that law; it must be articulated in the positive 
law0\ and (4) it must be promulgated. Aquinas' understanding of the natural law is 
insufficient for solving the postmodern problem of the inability to prefer certain judgments 
because it rests on a belief that is itself not justifiable by a decontextualized or privileged 
judgment. The role of God and the eternal law of God cannot be overstated for Aquinas' 
conception: the belief in both the existence and superior position of God, and that God is 
the source of certain natural inclinations for humans, is integral to both natural law's very 
existence and, of equal importance, the capability for criticism based on natural law. 
Unfortunately for modernity, the belief in God cannot be justified. lxi 
Immanuel Kant's On the Common Saying: 'This May be True in Theory. but it does not 
Applv in Practice ' 
Immanual Kant's political philosophy holds a prestigious position in neither the 
discipline of philosophy nor political theory. Two reasons explain this deficiency: (1) the 
works were only recently translatedlxii; and (2) Kant's critical philosophy is so demanding 
and stimulating that it absorbs a disproportionate amount of examination. Kant's political 
writings, however, are worthy of an examination because of the premise or motivation 
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behind them. Kant's philosophy is largely stimulated by David Hume's refutation of the 
philosophical possibility of induction (and therefore science)L"<.iii. Kant's solution to this 
problem was to concede that experience is insufficient to justify belief in science, and to 
begin the inquiry on different ground - Kant started with the mind rather than the objects 
of experience. This move led Kant to claim that 'laws of nature' are not inherent in nature 
(as Hume did) and to claim further that an a priori structure exists to human 
circumspection which orders nature: 
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all 
attempts to extend out knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them 
a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must 
therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, 
if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. . . . I must assume that the 
concepts, by means of which I obtain this determination [that our knowledge conforms 
to the objects of experience], conform to the object, or else I assume that the objects, or 
what is the same thing, that the experience in which alone, as given objects, they can be 
known, conform to the concepts .... In the latter case the outlook is more hopeful. For 
experience is itself a species of knowledge which involves understanding; and 
understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being 
given to me, and therefore as being a priori. They find expression in a priori concepts 
to which all objects of experience necessarily conform, and with which they must 
agree. 00v 
The move from experience being the provider of all knowledge to the understanding 
providing a priori knowledge which allows experience to succeed in allowing scientific 
knowledge leads to an entirely different conception of 'natural law' than Aquinas. While 
divinity made nature ordered for Aquinas, Kant's nature obtains order from the a priori 
principles in the understanding. Clearly, then, Kant's formulation of 'natural law' (Kant 
never uses the term natural law) will have certain advantages over Aquinas' because it can 
appeal to a priori principles rather than eternal law for legitimacy, and therefore it can 
avoid some elements of positivism since the position of authority is not integral to the 
legitimacy of an a priori principle. !xv Moral conduct is similar, for Kant, to nature: only if 
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rules or principles are found which are logically independent of experience can humans 
understand morality. The first of these principles is that morality implicitly assumes 
freedom - moral decisions are only possible if the will is assumed free to act. In addition, 
will is individual so freedom is also individual. Consequently, societies must be the 
consequence of a social compact, or willed participation by free individuals. Kant 
describes the role of freedom in the civil society: 
In all social contracts, we find a union of many individuals for some common end which 
they all share. But union as an end in itself which they all ought to share and which is 
thus an absolute and primary duty in all external relationships whatsoever among 
human beings (who cannot avoid mutually influencing one another), is only found in a 
society in so far as it constitutes a civil state, . . . And the end which is a duty itself in 
such external relationships, and which is indeed the highest formal condition of all other 
external duties, is the right of men under coercive public laws by which each man can 
be given what is due to him and secured against attack from any others. But the whole 
concept of an external right is derived entirely from the concept freedom in the mutual 
external relationships of human beings, and has nothing to do with the end which all 
men have by nature (i.e. the aim of achieving happiness) or with the recognized means 
of attaining that end. . . . Right is the restriction of each individual's freedom so that it 
harmonises with the freedom of everyone else ... [A] civil constitution is a relationship 
among.free men who are subject to coercive laws, while they retain their freedom within 
the general union with their fellows. Such is the requirement of pure reason, which 
legislates a priori, regardless of empirical ends (which can all be summed up under the 
general heading of happiness). Men have different views on the empirical end of 
happiness and what it consists of, so that as far as happiness is concerned, their will 
cannot be brought under any common principle nor thus under any external law 
harmonising with the freedom of everyone. !xvi 
Freedom exists on two levels for Kant. Freedom on the individual level is the ability to 
seek happiness. This freedom is ceded to the state at the advent of the social compact. 
Kant, incorporating a relativist position such that he can transcend it, affirms that the 
things which cause happiness vary from person to person, so the second level of freedom, 
that which is provided by the state, is the freedom to attempt to realize happiness. Under 
Kant's conception, the state is not allowed to coerce its subjects toward some conception 
of happiness, merely to protect freedom from infringes by others. Therefore Kant's 
conception rules out tyranny; indeed, it rules out the will of the sovereign as the ultimate 
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source of legitimacy because the guiding principle of the law is not the sovereign's 
discretion, whether that discretion aims at realization of the sovereign's happiness or the 
happiness of the subjects, because no single conception of happiness is true for all people. 
For the sake of thoroughness, Kant's a priori principles are: 
The civil state, regarded purely as a lawful state, is based on the following a priori 
principles: 
1. The .freedom of every member of society as a human being. 
2. The equality of each with all the others as a subject. 
!xvii 3. The independence of each member ofa commonwealth as a citizen. 
The principle of freedom requires that "no one can compel [someone else] to be happy in 
accordance with his conception of the welfare of others, for each may seek his happiness 
in whatever way he sees fit[. ]"!xviii The principle of equality is somewhat misleading if 
considered by name alone. This principle indicates that all subjects of the coercive 
authority of the head of state are equally subject to coercion; the head of state seems to 
not be subject to coercion. Notice that Kant does not use the term 'sovereign' to describe 
the source of coercion. Kant is clearly not locating sovereignty in a place separate from 
the subjects of coercion, even though the source of that coercion is independent of 
coercion. This constitutes a difficulty: if the head of state cannot be coerced, and coercion 
is the manner in which the a priori principles are insured, then the head of state is not 
subject to the a priori principles. The answer to this difficulty is that coercion is only 
legitimate when justified by the a priori principles, therefore if a head of state acts 
contrary to those principles, the head of state loses the position as head of state, and 
therefore becomes a subject of coercion, rather than independent of it. In addition, the 
judgments to coerce are from the will of the entire people - the head of state is merely an 
executive. The final principle, independence as a citizen, is essentially that people must be 
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free to vote in an independent fashion such that their untainted will can be executed. 
Significantly, Kant's critical philosophy was already complete at the time he wrote on 
political topics, consequently, he presupposes a categorical imperativelxix to judgment 
underlying the popular sovereignty. 
Kant's position is appealing because it seems to offer an escape from empiricism 
and allow for legitimate coercion. Empiricism is avoided because of Kant's reversal of 
epistemological presumption such that the mind is the source of knowledge and sensation 
the fountain which provides the material which the mind arranges. Unfortunately, this is a 
superficial solution because the belief that the mind arranges sensation in a manner 
universal to humans such that all of our judgments are sufficiently similar for legitimate 
behavioral expectations and prescription is no better than the belief that it does not. In 
other words, Kant's solution only works if people accept his underlying premise for which 
there is no 'justification'. 
Kant also is problematic at the juncture between nature and morality, and morality 
and law. The linkage between nature and morality is, according to Kant, that both are 
'assembled' by the mind. However, this is suspect. An arrangement of nature by the mind 
makes some sense based on, if nothing else, evolutionary theory, because expectations 
about nature are necessary for efficient foraging and hunting. Arrangement of the moral 
realm does not have the same urgency and may not receive that sort of mental attention. 
More seriously, what could the mind order with respect to morality? No possible answers 
are offered here because there do not seem to be any. 
The problem with Kant's relationship between morality and law stems from a 
'linguistic phenomenology' -based examination of the two terms. Laws, regulations and 
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commands are obeyed, whereas principles are subject to volition: humans can choose to 
follow them. Acts are labeled morally praiseworthy or blameworthy because the acts are 
not accidental, rather they are chosen. Indeed, this very notion of choice is the foundation 
for Kant's a priori principle of freedom since freedom of will is necessary and 
presupposed by the notion of choice. In addition, disobedience to law carries an 
expectation of punishment because laws are enforced. The choice to disregard a principle, 
however, may carry disagreeable results, but the similarity ends at that point. Though the 
similarity between law and morality is suspect, Kant's insight is still quite good - even the 
notion of law includes some notion that following the law is a choice. 
In spite of Kant's difficulties, the formulation of a standard for critiquing behavior 
grounded on a priori principles provides a lesson useful for the project of this thesis. 
While Aquinas' rules of behavior were established heteronomously (i.e., they are 
derivative of the eternal law), Kant's rules are somehow 'just there' - present to cognition. 
This difference is significant for two reasons: (1) it offers another option about how to 
institute a standard for judgment; and (2) humans tend to shun heteronomous 
prescriptions. The importance of the first reason why the difference is significant only 
becomes apparent after articulation of the second; the value of a second manner (Kant's a 
priori principles) in which to institute standards is not clear unless the first option 
(Aquinas' natural law) is demonstrated to be comparatively inferior. 
While humans clearly rebel against slave-holders and other external rulers or 
sources oflaw, perhaps the deepest example that humans shun external rules is the 
existence of government itself Religion is the epitome of heteronomous prescriptions, 
and, ifit wasn't a failure (in some very profound sense) government would not be 
Z. May - Honors Thesis 
page 41 of68. 
necessary for providing and regulating behavioral norms. The Bible even alludes to the 
natural rejection of Divine prescriptions in "Genesis": 1xx 
Now the serpent was more crafty than any of the wild animals the LORD God had 
made. He said to woman, "Did God really say, 'You must not eat from any tree in the 
garden'?" 
The woman said to the serpent, "We may eat fruit from the trees in the garden, but 
God did say, 'You must not eat fruit from the tree that is in the middle of the garden, 
and you must not touch it, or you will surely die. "' 
"You will not surely die," the serpent said to the woman. "For God knows that when 
you eat it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil. .. 
. [s]he took some and ate it. She also gave some to her husband, who was with her and 
he ate it. Then the eyes of both of them were opened and they realized they were naked; 
so they sewed fig leaves together and coverings for themselves. 
Then the man and his wife heard the sound of the LORD God as he was walking in 
the garden . . . and they hid ... But the LORD God called to the man, "Where are 
you?" 
He answered, "I heard you in the garden and I was afraid because I was naked; so I 
hid." 
And he [God] said, "Who told you that you were naked? Have you eaten from the 
tree that I conunanded you not to eat from?"l.xxi 
Several interesting observations spring from this reference: (1) the cause of the 
degeneration from eternal bliss (Eden) to the earthly realm is a natural phenomenon (a 
snake) which is not Satan - at least no mention of that identity is made in the text; (2) the 
command of God is indeed remarkably similar to law - man and woman feared breaking it, 
its authority is derived from the superior position of God, and it is verbally promulgated; 
(3) the desire for wisdom or to break God's command motivated the breakage of God's 
command because other trees produced excellent fruit - the tree was unique because it 
bore the fruit of wisdom and because it was forbidden. Notice that after eating the fruit, 
the humans fear showing themselves naked before God, but do not fear his wrath nor do 
they appear shameful for their disobedience; considering that they have acquired 
knowledge of good and evil, this is a curious judgment to say the least. In any event, 
humans seem to reject prescriptions from on high, so a standard for judgment like Kant's, 
which is not from on high, is useful. 
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Overall, the ideas gleaned from an examination of the philosophical technique for 
dealing with relativism and positivism (Plato), a standard for judgment derived from a 
higher with legitimacy contingent on that higher position (Aquinas), and a standard for 
judgment grounded in logic and ontological necessity (Kant), produce an approach for 
dealing with the problem of this thesis viz., how to concede the truth of the relativist 
position but avoid its consequences of the impotent state, and the illegitimacy of rebellion 
or critique. From Plato, the lesson is that a belief must be found that (1) can be hidden or 
protected such that those who hold the belief will consider it uncritically, and (2) that 
conflicts with the effects of relativism or relativism itself Then the preferred belief must 
be given a privileged position by persuasion accomplished through the framing of the issue 
and the conflicting beliefs in the dialectic. Whether the belief is true or not is of little 
consequence for Plato. From Aquinas is the idea that the standard should serve as a guide 
for where the law is needed, and a possible vehicle for implementation of a standard: 
human inclinations. From Kant came another vehicle for implementing a standard: 
structures mapped onto experience by, and in, the mind which logically require certain 
conditions for human existence. Kant's is a human natural law. 
The belief necessary for implementing Plato's method which conflicts with, and if 
properly couched, could unseat relativism is implicit in Kuhn's notion of World View as 
discussed in the "Introduction" to this thesis. A World View is a set of expectations 
which "color" or condition the experiences people have. The very notion of altering 
experience suggests that some experience exists to alter. In other words, while the 
background and culture of an individual may modify experiences, the sensations of 
phenomena themselves are received by a human being. Therefore, two levels to human 
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experience exist, the sensation itself received and processed by a sensory apparatus 
roughly the same for all humans, and then a conditioning of that experience (e.g., which 
objects of experience receive attention and the identification of the objects) occurs 
strongly influenced by background and culture. A belief corollary to the belief in a 
'human' level of experience is the belief in science. Of all the disciplines of academia and 
sources of information, none compare to the natural science in terms of authority; many of 
the other disciplines attempt to model natural science's methodology to acquire similar 
authority, hence social sciences. 
In essence, the natural inclinations of humans, or a priori structures, must be 
relegitimized within a relativist frame through a belief presently held. This belief must be 
couched in a dialectic against relativism such that it constitutes an assumption and 
relativism constitutes a suspect position. That belief is that experience is the foundation of 
knowledge, experience is human, and human experience is privileged over culturally 
conditioned experience. The discipline of science, because it manifests these beliefs is 
given unequaled authority of judgment (not necessarily only descriptive so long as the 
judgment remains somewhat shrouded). Artificial intelligence, if infused with scientific 
authority, could either manifest a consciousness without cultural conditioning, or the 
general public could be told it had done so. From this set of conditions the crisis of 
modernity may be solved. 
III 
Z. May - Honors Thesis 
page 44 of 68. 
The discipline of Artificial Intelligence is a conjunction of these two beliefs 
(human, or pre-cultural, experience & the legitimacy of natural science). If the authority 
of science were exerted to claim that science had actually 'found' pre-cultural experience 
and could produce judgments from that type of experience, then the standard and 
prescriptions of Kant or Aquinas could be instituted. Artificial Intelligence is the discipline 
that could manifest the pre-cultural judgments (or at least the people could be told an 
artificial intellect was producing a judgment by scientific authority). This daunting feat is 
arguably accomplishable because of connectionist architecture. Contemporary AI 
(artificial intelligence) research programs use machines that are often not remotely like the 
computers seen in offices and households. The latter are von Neumann Machines, rather 
than connectionist machines. Very roughly, the difference between the two is that von 
Neumann machines are symbol manipulators and connectionist machines are dynamic 
systems. This difference is best illustrated by a governor for steam engines developed 
during the latter half of the eighteenth century_ lxxii The steam governor was developed 
because high-quality spinning and weaving required a uniform source of power, and the 
speed of a flywheel driven by a steam engine is affected by both the pressure of the steam 
from the boilers and the workload placed on the engine, and these are constantly 
fluctuating. The speed of the flywheel could be regulated because the pipe carrying steam 
from the boiler to a piston which turned the flywheel had a valve that allowed alteration of 
the pressure on the piston, and therefore speed of the flywheel. A uniform speed could be 
maintained, then, if the valve were turned at the right time by the right amount to cope 
with changes in workload and pressure. A governor was necessary to determine how 
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much to tum the valve, and to execute that determination. One governor broke the 
regulation of when and how much to tum the valve into different subtasks that constitute 
lxxi .. 
an algorithm: 11 
I. Measure the speed of the flywheel . 
2. Compare the actual speed of the flywheel against the desired speed. 
3. Ifno discrepancy, return to step 1. Otherwise, 
a. measure the current steam pressure 
b. calculate the desired alteration in steam pressure 
c. calculate the necessary throttle adjustment 
1. Make the throttle valve adjustment. 
2. Return to step 1. 
The engineering problems associated with this sort of governor would correspond to 
constructing the various components and linking them such that the system functions in a 
coherent problem. While this device could probably solve the steam pressure problem, it 
was not the actual solution discovered in the 18th century. James Watt adapted existing 
windmill technology into an elegant device that consisted of a vertical spindle geared into 
the flywheel itself such that it rotated at a speed directly dependent on that of the flywheel 
itself Attached to the spindle by hinges were two arms, and on the end of each arm was a 
metal ball. As the spindle turned, centrifugal force drove the balls outward and hence 
upward. By this clever arrangement this arm motion was linked directly to the throttle 
valve. The result was that as the speed of the flywheel increased, the arms raised closing 
the valve and restricting the flow of steam~ as the speed decreased, the arms lowered 
opening the valve and allowing more steam to flow. The engine adopted a constant speed, 
and maintained a remarkably high amount of smoothness when faced with steam and load 
variations. 
The two devices described are deeply different. The first device is a computational 
device and relies heavily on representations and computations upon those representations. 
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It measures its environment and makes a symbolic representation of that measurement and 
performs a series of operations on the representation. The second device does not employ 
representations. While associating the angle at which the arms are located with a 
representation of the flywheel's speed is somewhat appealing, the angle does not stand for 
a certain speed or state of the flywheel. The angle is a correlative of the speed, but not a 
representation of it. In addition, the arms move immediately when an alteration in speed 
occurs; no translation from reality to symbolic occurs. Both the arm and the wheel are 
parts of an interdependent dynamic system since the arm angle and the engine speed are at 
all times both determined by, and determining, each other's behavior. 
Von Neumann machines and connectionist machines are similar to the 
computational steam governor and the dynamic steam governor, respectively. Von 
Neumann machines take inputs, translate them into symbols, operate upon the symbols in 
a fashion dictated by formal rules instituted in the system, and produce outputs. 
Connectionist systems receive stimuli through a sensory apparatus, the energy or signals 
from which is disseminated to various nodes (thousands in several different layers) that 
collect energy and produce a burst after a given level of energy is received. This burst 
travels to other nodes and is collected and may cause them to 'fire' a burst. The energy 
forms a unique pattern of reactions among the nodes and after the system returns to a 
steady state (in other words, the stimulus has caused all the firings of nodes possible for 
that stimulus and the system has stabilized) a behavior or output occurs. The level of 
energy that must be received for a particular node to fire and the amount of energy it fires 
vary from node to node. The idea of a connectionist system is to model human cognitive 
functions at the neural level. Though cognitive scientists do not know how to explain the 
Z. May - Honors Thesis 
page 47 of68. 
relationship between neural activity and consciousness, consciousness is clearly an 
emergent property of the patterns of activity in the human brain; from brain activity 
emerges mental activity. 
Connectionist systems and their capabilities are best understood compared to 
symbol manipulation machines because symbol manipulators were rather successful at 
doing low-order cognitive functions but couldn't perform higher order patter-recognition 
based functions. The problem with symbol manipulation machines was that they could not 
ascribe meaning to the symbols which they manipulated with formal rules; the Achilles 
heal of such machines was that they couldn't understand what they computed. To 
perform this explication of connectionist systems through a comparison with von 
Neumann machines requires a step back to discuss what is actually being claimed and the 
problem with von Neumann machines not being able to 'understand' things. 
Computer simulations of human cognitive abilities are categorized in "Minds, 
Brains, and Programs. ,,!xxiv The two categories depend upon the view held by an 
individual. If an individual considered a computer program simply a tool for studying the 
mind, he or she falls in the 'weak' AI (artificial intelligence) category; if one claimed an 
appropriately programmed computer could really be a mind, one holds a 'strong' view of 
AI. These categories originally applied to claims concerning the symbol processing 
machines, and John Searle made an argument in that piece ("Minds, Brains, and 
Programs") against the 'strong' approach to AI. 
A few years after Searle published his work, insurmountable semantic problems 
with the symbol manipulation approach and some key advances in connectionist systems 
motivated an ascent of connectionism. Many advocates of connectionist systems claim 
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those simulations are sufficiently different from symbol manipulation machines for a 
connectionist system to be a mind: they subscribed to 'strong' AI. 
Searle did not accept a 'strong' AI position based on connectionism either. Searle 
is wrong on that position, but to make clear why an analysis of Searle' s original argument 
against symbol manipulation machines is necessary. The argument advanced by Searle 
against 'strong' AI claims by symbol manipulation machine designers is an analogy titled 
the 'Chinese Room' argument. In the 'Chinese Room' argument, Searle is locked in a 
room and given a large batch of Chinese writing. Searle does not understand Chinese. He 
is then given a second batch of Chinese writing with a set of rules which allow him to 
correlate the first set of symbols with the second. Searle understands the rules in English 
concerning the Chinese symbols as would any native speaker of English. Searle is then 
given a third set of Chinese characters and some more rules in English. These rules 
instruct Searle on how to correlate elements in the first two batches with the third and 
how to give back certain Chinese characters (shapes) in response to the shapes given in 
the third batch. Searle is then given a series of questions in English, which he answers 
naturally. Later, some Chinese symbols which are interpreted as questions by Chinese 
speaking people outside the 'Chinese Room' are given to Searle. Searle is a quick learner 
of rules, so he quickly fashions together some Chinese characters according to the set of 
rules and gives this series of symbols (externally considered an answer) to the people 
outside the room. To the outside observer, Searle appears to understand both Chinese 
and English equally well. The distinction Searle makes is that, in the case of dealing with 
Chinese, he simply manipulates formal symbols; to Searle, the Chinese characters are just 
shapes and not about anything. That is Searle's key point: the rules do not give meaning 
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to the characters.1xxv 
To understand whether the 'Chinese Room' argument applies to connectionist 
architecture, a brief description of connectionism by William Bechtel, an eminent 
connectionist, follows: 
The basic components of the connectionist architecture are simple units which, like 
neurons, are, at any given time, activated to some degree. Typically, this activation 
consists in an electrical charge. These units, again like neurons, are connected (these 
connections can be of varying strengths) to other unites so that, depending on their own 
activations, they can act to increase (excite) or decrease (inhibit) the activation of other 
units. Additionally, in some connectionist systems, these connection strengths can be 
altered as a result of activity in the system so that the effect of one unit on another can 
change over time. . .. 
The basic processing system is an ensemble of such connected units. The activity 
such an ensemble begins when an initial pattern of activation is supplied to some or all 
the units. This pattern can be viewed as a problem given to the ensemble. Processing 
ends when the system settles into a stable state.lxxvi. 
The 'Chinese Room' argument is applied to connectionism is a construction of Searle 
himself and is actually rather poor: the 'Chinese Gym' . The 'Chinese Gym' is a hall in 
which many monolingual English-speaking individuals interact. Searle claims these people 
could carry out the same operations as nodes and synapses in the connectionist 
architecture and that no single individual would understand Chinese, nor does any way 
exist for the system to learn Chinese words. 
Noteworthy cognitive scientists Paul and Patricia Churchland answer Searle's 
'Chinese Gym' argument with two counter-arguments. Firstly, the inability of any single 
node to understand Chinese is irrelevant since no single human synapse could understand 
same. Secondly, were this 'Gym' constructed on an appropriate cosmic scale, it would 
function as a brain. lxxvii 
Remarkably, both sides are right. The 'Chinese Gym' cannot understand Chinese, 
but not for the reasons Searle gives. The Churchlands are right because the cosmically 
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scaled 'Chinese Gym' would function like a brain. Unfortunately, a brain alone is not 
sufficient for attributing meaning or aboutness to symbols. The reason is one that Searle 
seemed to understand when he wrote "Minds, Brains, and Programs," but seems to have 
forgotten: causal connections. The input into the 'Chinese Gym' could not represent or be 
about anything if it simply an initial pattern of activation on some nodes, unless that 
pattern of activity were exactly the same as a stimulus humans receive from a sense and 
the 'nodes' in the 'Chinese Gym' (i. e., the gymnasts) had the necessary preconceived 
connection strengths to understand the input. The strengths of the connection strengths 
must be preconceived (or a priori) because the 'Chinese Gym' cannot learn since it has no 
sensual apparatus and no intrinsic 'goals' . The perceptual apparatus is necessary since the 
pattern of activity which serves as input could not be associated with anything (and 
therefore not mean anything) absent sensation. The intrinsic goals are needed for 
relevancy or focus when perceiving things. Meaning is (at least partially) assigned 
because, or is reliant upon, the disposition in which a perception places a perceiver. For 
example: imagine a Martian with a radically different biochemical composition than 
humans, and a typical human in a room in which a near-empty glass lies near a sink to be 
washed. This Martian, being from Mars, has a strong need for water, it is relevant for it. 
Conversely, the human exists in an environment in which water is abundant. If both 
organisms strolled through the room and took note of what they focused on, the Martian, 
likely adapted to perceive water effectively, would notice the glass very quickly. The 
human, as it strolls through the room, may not even notice the dirty glass (and if so, for 
different reasons). Clearly, this dirty glass is assigned a significance and different meaning 
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depending upon the 'intrinsic goals' of the organism examining the environment, and these 
goals are grounded in biology. lxxviii 
Essentially, the original 'Chinese Room' argument made the claim that the causal 
connections of symbol manipulating machines were unable to give meaning to the symbols 
they manipulated. This is so because their link with the outside world did not transfer 
anything but syntax. The 'Chinese Gym' argument does not address this interaction with 
the outside world any differently than the 'Chinese Room', so it offers little aid to 
understanding whether connectionist systems can understand, and therefore surmount the 
chief roadblock to artificial intelligence. 
Some answers to the original 'Chinese Room' (and therefore 'Chinese Gym') 
argument were made on behalf of connectionist systems. Applied to connectionist 
systems, the 'Chinese Room' would claim that if Searle's mind were given stimuli directly 
to the nodes of his neural network in his brain, and that the stimuli was the same that the 
human perceptual apparatus gave the brain when it saw Chinese characters, and the 
readout of his brain activity after subject to the stimuli would be considered an answer by 
people outside of Searle's mind, then Searle would still not understand Chinese. The 
reason why is that the stimuli given to Searle's mind correspond to Chinese characters 
only to people outside of Searle's mind observing the readout of his brain activity; Searle 
is receiving arbitrary electrical activity. The signals are arbitrary to Searle because his 
brain is unable to recognize the patterns of activity. Connectionists argue that this inability 
to recognize these patterns is because the connection strengths are not designed to 
recognize Chinese characters. They are right, but since Connectionist systems are trained, 
not designed, one must ask whether Searle (as a human) could learn these patterns and 
Z. May - Honors Thesis 
page 52 of 68. 
relate them to their meaning. He could not because he has no perceptual experience with 
which to relate the patterns of activity; but were he to learn Chinese, he would acquire 
such referential experience and understand the patterns of activity. Therefore, if his neural 
network were stimulated with a pattern of activity essentially the same as that of seeing a 
Chinese character, then Searle would understand the stimulus even though it went directly 
to his neural network, rather than through his sensory apparatus (eyes). In other words, 
the pattern of activity and external stimuli are 'identical' . Thus, if the connection weights 
of Searle' s brain are identical with a Chinese speaker (because he learned Chinese), then 
he could understand the pattern of activity. 
In essence, the problem with traditional artificial intelligence is that the symbols on 
which the computations operated were autonomous of the things they represent. The 
connectionist strategy for overcoming this autonomy is similar to the steam engine 
governor designed by Watt: "allow internal representations [patterns of activity] to be 
shaped by the inputs and outputs of the system so that they become part of the system's 
adaptation to its environment."lxxix This cannot be done on symbol manipulation 
machines, but it can on connectionist machines because the operations and the 
representations are the same in a connectionist system, whereas a symbol manipulator 
makes a sharp distinction between the operation and the objects (symbols) on which the 
operations perform. In addition, since the weights of the connection strength are 
predetermined (much as if the system had certain primordial biological dispositions), its 
environment would have 'meaning' or significance to it. Certain nodes (called 'hidden 
units' a recent discovery) allow recalibration of those connection strengths such that the 
system improves its pattern recognition based on the original 'goals' instituted in the 
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system through its initial settings of connection strengths. 
The one problem with connectionist systems is this: while typical humans seem to 
know what they are thinking when they have internal representations, simple connectionist 
systems do not. Theorists suspect this is due to something other than the "intrinsic 
intentionality of our internal states" .1xxx Some speculate the source is natural language 
because learning a natural language requires categorization of much of the environment 
and these categories govern actions in the environment. Therefore, one's ability to 
recognize one's thoughts (internal activity) is needed to communicate those thoughts. 
What is required is a more sophisticated set of connections (the human mind has billions of 
neurons, not to mention connections between neurons, whereas the most advanced 
connectionist system has tens of thousands) such that more intricate patterns can be stored 
and distinguished, allowing communication. lxxxi The problem with such a large system is 
calibrating the initial connection strengths such that it recognizes patterns of activity like 
humans. This reduces the problem to one of engineering, not theory, though. 
Conclusion 
To take the philosophical premise ofrelativism seriously has practical 
consequences which are not acceptable. Philosophy must protect itself and the rest of 
society by censoring itself and constructing a belief or standard from which prescriptions 
can emerge. The task of philosophy, then, is to insure the standard is not destructive of 
itself The belief(s) which, if handled appropriately, allows this end to be realized is that 
scientific knowledge is true knowledge, and 'human' experience both exists and is 
privileged over conditioned or perspectival experience. Sufficiently sophisticated 
connectionist machines, if weighted to respond to sensation in the same fashion as humans 
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do, might be able to model judgments on a 'human' level, as opposed to a conditioned or 
cultural level. This possibility, if realized, could be used to manifest judgments usable as 
standards for critiquing judgments of the state and of individuals. In reality, even if 
connectionism fails or is too unsophisticated, a group of scientists could claim it 
succeeded and produce principle like Kant'slxxxii which few people would ever know were 
fabricated. Fortunately, connectionism will likely work: sensation does seem objective at a 
human level (at least if one accepts the underlying assumptions of natural science )lx.xxiii and 
the initial results are quite positive, and the philosophy behind connectionism matches up 
well with phenomenological accounts of human beings. While the system would not be 
human, it might solve the human problem of relativism. 
IV 
Objection 1 
If relativism is true, why prefer so-called human judgments to judgments ordinary 
people make? 
The answer is that no 'true reason' exists to privilege human judgments (such as 
those rendered by an appropriately designed connectionist machine) over cultural 
judgments. Human judgments do, however, seem capable of being a standard against 
which cultural, sovereign, and individual judgments can be compared. So long as the 
standard or machine produced Kantian principles which legitimized tolerance but wasn't 
tolerant of intolerance and tyranny (because intolerance would violate Kant ' s freedom 
principle), the project would be successful. 
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Objection 2 
The United States seems just fine without standards beyond positivism: it makes 
judgments and people respect them. While no 'external' standard may exist guiding the 
Supreme Court, its decisions don't lead to dissolution of society or an impotent state. 
Answer: this is true, but the present circumstances are philosophically bankrupt 
and open for potential tyranny. Were the Supreme Court to decide democracy (or voting) 
is suspended and that they become the rulers according to the Constitution, no recourse is 
available save rebellion against a government with the strongest military in the world. 
Even if the military joined the rebellion, and it succeeded, the instituted regime would face 
the same inability to control the sovereign as the former situation. One could counter that 
the Constitution prohibits this sort tyrannical decision, but under positivism the 
Constitution is what the Supreme Court says it is, so nothing is impossible. While the 
likelihood is incredibly remote (at least to our perception) the potential evil is dreadful and 
arguably unacceptable. 
Objection 3 
An artificial intelligence which successfully produced 'human' principles of justice 
would mean an end of philosophy. 
Answer: so long as the principles are Kantian, political philosophy would end 
because the closest thing to a 'good' regime is attained. Other sorts of philosophy, 
however, would remain. 
Objection 4 
Principles currently exist which guide states. The United States, for instance, 
returned Kuwait from the clutches of Saddam Hussein in the name of freedom. 
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Answer: even if the action was made for humanitarian rather than economic 
interests, it was still philosophically arbitrary; were George Bush asked to justify his 
humanitarian conviction, he could not do so in a fashion which transcends relativism. 
Objection 5 
Isn't an appeal to the judgments of'human' experience arbitrary as well? 
Answer: yes, that is why Plato is important. If one places the opinion that 'human' 
judgments are superior to 'particular' judgments in the dialectic such that the opinion 
privileging 'human' judgments is accepted uncriticallylxxxiv the postmodern opinion could 
be defeated. 
Objection 6 
Doesn't your argument presuppose 'human' experiences in order to prove them. 
In other words, in order to calibrate the connection strengths of the nodes in a 
connectionist architecture, must not you measure the outputs of that system with 
presupposed 'correct' outputs, thereby already presupposing a 'correct' 'human' 
response? 
Answer: true to a degree, however this essay is more concerned with answers than 
the 'truth' of artificial intelligence. One argument that the 'human' answers may not be 
presupposed: Human reception of SSR (Surface Spectral Reflectance) wavelengths seems 
to fall in a fairly static set of numbers which humans can perceive, and one could compare 
the pattern of connection activity in some human neural systems when subject to a certain 
wavelength pattern with the pattern of activity in a connectionist system when subject to 
the same stimulus. In other words, output behavior would not be the determining 
standard of whether the connection strengths were correct. 
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Objection 7 
The meaning of many things is from culture. If the connectionist machine 
proposed models sub-cultural judgment, then how might problems be explained to this 
machine? In other words, without culture it cannot understand the problems associated 
with beings which exist in a culture. 
Answer: the very judgment that something is a problem is the result of culture and 
relative. For example, the ancient Greeks believed reading silently was worthy of 
punishment. A connectionist machine probably would not recognize reading silently as a 
problem, or even understand the ancient Greek position. In this case, the connectionist 
machine's judgment (viz., that reading silently is not unacceptable) would overturn the 
cultural judgment even though the machine did not understand the cultural judgment. 
Regarding the deeper issue of whether the machine could understand anything at 
all because culture is integral to meaning: probably. The reason a connectionist machine 
may be able to understand things is because humans are fundamentally oriented. In other 
words, humans may be biologically determined to prefer certain things. If this is true, 
these preferences could provide a very low-level foundation for meaning. 
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i William H. Rehnquist, quoted in Vukan Kuik, "Government of Law and Judicial Review," Vera Lex, 
(Winter/Spring, 1992) 10. 
ii Tyranny is not necessarily autocratic; democracies are certainly capable of tyrannical rule if the minority 
is institutionally oppressed. Tyranny is a term laden with historical significance, but can defined as rule 
in the interest of the ruler(s). 
iii Merlo J. Pusey, Charles Evans Hughes, (New York: Macmillan, 1951) 204. 
iv Confusingly, modernity is right now, but the identity ofthis time is 'postmodern'; modern people think 
postmodernly. 
v That does not, however, prevent behavioral prescriptions from being made. 
vi Or, in the legal manifestation of relativism: positivism, the legitimacy of laws is contingent on the 
position from which they came - the will of the sovereign is sufficient for legitimacy. See John Austin, 
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, lectures I, V, VI, ed. M.P. Golding, in The Nature of The 
Law: Readings in Legal Philosophy, ed. M.P. Golding (New York: Random House, 1966) 85-6. 
vii This point will be developed carefully in the next section. Sufficient for the present discussion is the 
example of Anaximander: he believed that all things had a single source (the "Unbounded"). This belief 
could not have been based on experience and I suspect that Anaximander never bothered to scrutinize this 
belief - it was ingrained in his belief system. Experience did, however, guide the solution to the problem 
presented by his belief. His experience-based realization that the elements (i.e., water, air, fire) - his 
teacher's solution was water - tended to corrupt the integrity of other elements led him to claim that the 
source of all things must necessarily reside outside experience since all things in experience are 'bounded' 
by other objects of experience (not necessarily in the contentious sense that elements bound one another). 
viii Plato (and Socrates) was not a 'weak empiricist', but he was bounded by this 'weak empiricism' on 
both sides - Aristotle clearly privileges experience as the source of knowledge (yet carries a set of 
teleological beliefs not warranted by experience) . Though the absence of Plato in western philosophy 
prior to the 19th century is somewhat intentional (references to Plato were present in Aristotle's work, so 
manuscripts could presumably been found if the desire was present), the 'weak empiricist' epistemology 
flourished in its vacuum. Prominent philosophers who employed 'weak empiricism' include St. Thomas 
Aquinas, Machiavelli, Spinoza, Hobbes, Descartes, and Berkeley. 
ix Hegel claims that Hume and Locke include 'categories' or structures to experience that are not present 
to experience. In other words, the 'strong empiricists' base their explanations of knowledge on certain 
'supersensible' structures. G. W. F. Hegel, Logic, trans. William Wallace (Oxford: Clarendon) 1975, 62-
63 . 
x Indeed, even if innate ideas (or a priori structures of cognition, as Kant will claim, for that matter) 
existed, how could we know they existed if they (or some necessary consequence of them) were not 
experienced. 
xi Thinkers on artificial intelligence label this cause a difference in the 'substrate domain' of humans, a set 
of cognitive limitations mapped onto human behavior options. For example, when someone is playing 
basketball, things like the length of one' s arm are not considered when one attempts a slam-dunk. The 
range of motion and other physical capabilities are already 'understood' as humans circumspect the world 
around them. See Adrian Cussins, "The Connectionist Construction of Concepts", in: Margaret Boden, 
ed., The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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xii Were the individual someone entrenched in ornithology and able to perceive the jet as man-made, and 
consequently knew the object couldn't be a bird as she understood birds, would consider the experience an 
anomaly - an experience which could produce a 'crisis' for her and possibly a shift in expectations. 
xiii Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd edition, enlarged (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1970) 113, 115. 
xiv Kuhn implies the astronomers who considered what they saw in their telescope a star had the 
information necessary to 'discover' that the object was 'really' a planet because they observed the 'star' 
over a period of time and didn't notice the motion; the astronomers were not expecting motion so didn't 
see it even though the object was moving. 
xv Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) 26. 
xvi Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robison (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1962). 
The interpretation given prior to this endnote requires some justification. What follow are some 
interpretations of textual citations from Being and Time. The first claim I make about Heidegger is that 
the notion of a 'there' or position from which Dasien orients itself is central. On page 171 of the 
translation of Being and Time Heidegger states: 
By its very nature, Dasein brings its "there" along with it. If it lacks its "there", it is not 
factically the entity which is essentially Dasein; indeed, it is not this entity at all. 
Dasein is its disclosedness.[emphasis original]. 
Dasein is its 'there' and is disclosed by its 'there'. Dasein's understanding of itself arises 
through the manner in which its 'there' is disclosed and that which is disclosed. Being 'there' 
has two parts: (1) Being-in-the-world as a whole; and (2) Being-there. Being in the world is 
disclosed by the 'State of Mind' through a mood. In other words, this mood gives a general 
character to how Dasein looks at the world: 
A mood assails us. It comes neither from 'outside' nor from 'inside', but arises out of 
Being-in-the-world, as a way of such Being. . . . The mood has already disclosed, in 
every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct 
oneself towards something. . . . Existentially, a state-of-mind implies a disclosive 
submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that matters to us. 
Indeed from the ontological point of view we must as a general principle leave the 
primary discovery of the world to 'bare mood'. [emphasis original, pages 176-177 
Being and Time]. 
A mood {part of the state-of-mind) makes it possible to orient oneself. This orientation is a product of the 
'Understanding': 
In the act of understanding [Verstehen], . . . the relations indicated above 
[purposeful relations to the world] must have been previously disclosed; the act of 
understanding holds them in this disclosedness. . . . The relational character which 
these relationships of assigning possess, we take as one of signifying. . . . The 
relational totality of this signifying we call "significance". This is what makes up the 
structure of the world-the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is. [Italics 
original, underline emphasis mine, page 120). 
Heidegger is more explicit that 'Understanding' (as opposed to 'the act of understanding') is the source of 
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'significance' and is constitutive of Being 'there' in the following passage from page 182: 
State-of-mind is one of the existential structures in which the Being of the 'there' 
maintains itself. Equiprimordial with it in constituting this Being is understanding. 
To say that in existing, Dasein is its "there'', is equivalent to saying that the world is 
'there'; its Being-there is Being-in. And the latter is likewise 'there', as that for the 
sake of which Dasein is. In the "for-the-sake-of-which", existing Being-in-the-world is 
disclosed as such, and this disclosedness we have called "understanding". In the 
understanding of the "for-the-sake-of-which", the significance which is grounded 
therein, is disclosed along with it. The disclosedness of understanding, as the 
disclosedness of the "for-the-sake-of-which" and of significance equiprimordailly, 
pertains to the entirety of Being-in-the-world. Significance is that on the basis of which 
the world is disclosed as such. 
In essence, since the world is disclosed to Dasein (and, since Dasein is part of the world, Dasein is also 
disclosed in the same fashion) through the understanding's grounding of significance, and that grounding 
is not an universal understanding, but an understanding which is always already oriented and views things 
'for-the-sake-of-which' (for the sake ofDasein's Being, see the bottom of page 116), all things are relative 
in a very extreme sense, to this orientation, or perspective. 
xvii I realize I cannot make this claim because I do not have a privileged position which allows me to 
survey the experiences of all people throughout history. I can suspect its true, though, and the burden 
probably falls on someone who claims they experienced a sensation indicating sensation is the source of 
knowledge. 
xviii Whether of 'internal' or 'external' phenomenon. 
xix The collapse of corporation and person presents certain problems with respect to the law (the law 
distinguishes them in some cases), but because law under a relativist perspective could not legitimately 
distinguish between the two entities (its judgment would be relative), I collapse them to indicate that both 
could refute a claim of membership by the state. 
"" Presumably because they share a similar perspective - e.g., cultural relativism. 
xxi The judgment of which behaviors, beliefs, or practices determined membership could not appeal to 
some external authority, so could not claim superiority to an individual' s judgment. 
xxii Or corporations, since they are considered 'persons' under law. 
xxiii Of course the requirement of superior judgment for legitimacy may itself be relative and misguided. 
The very act of writing about relativism seriously, however, implicitly recognizes that all claims made are 
provisional and ultimately validated only by the reader's consent. It seems obvious, though, that action 
against someone who disagrees based on a judgment no better than no one else's is mere arbitrariness. 
xxiv In the sense given above viz., rule for the rulers, not the ruled. 
xxv Reginald E. Allen, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle, (New York: The Free Press, 1991) 1, 28-29. 
xxvi Aristotle's Physics (204b) indicates Anaximander's position was that "[t]hey are in opposition to one 
another • air is cold, water is moist, and fire hot - therefore, if any one of them were unbounded, the rest 
would have ceased to be by this time." 
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xxvii Reginald E. Allen, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle, (New York: The Free Press, 1991) 2-3, 29-
30. 
xxviii For information on geographic origin of sophists and suggestion of uniform experience of natural 
phenomenon but not human conduct: Ibid., 16; information regarding Thrasyrnachus is not available in 
that text. 
xxix Indeed, arguing that a certain position agrees with an 'objective' standard of right and wrong while 
another position does not implies the belief that a certain position is right and others less right. If sophists 
followed this technique, and the standard was really considered 'objective' (not mercurial), then they 
could not perform the task of sophists viz., winning any argument, not just the argument which agreed 
with 'objective' principles. 
"""Plato's characterization of the Soul, for example, is not the same across dialogues and it is not clear 
whether the metaphor of two horses jockeyed by reason (Phaedrus) is included in the holistic account of 
the soul after death in the Republic or the Phaedo. 
xxxi The version of Plato's republic used in this essay is: Plato, The Republic of Plato, 2"d Edition, trans. 
Allan Bloom (New York: HarperCollins, 1968). 
xxxii Plato, The Symposium, trans. Walter Hamilton (London: Penguin Books, Clays ltd., St. Ives plc., 
1951), 100. 
xxxiii Or perhaps writing in his journal ... 
xxxiv This position is contrary to many interpreters of Plato's Republic. Kirnon Lycos, (Plato on Justice and 
Power, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1987)) for example, claims that understanding 
"Book I" of the Republic turns on knowing that the positions of the interlocutors represent prevalent 
viewpoints on justice at the time of Socrates. While knowing this is helpful, the information is present in 
the dialogue - Cephalus, and his heir, clearly a stand in for tradition and Thrasymachus stands in for 
authority - so an historical study is not integral, only useful and confirming, for comprehension of the text. 
=socrates, in the very last paragraph of the Republic says: 
And thus, Glaucon a tale was saved and not lost; and it could save us, if we were 
persuaded by it, and we shall make a good crossing of the river of Lethe and not defile 
our soul. 
The tale can save (a stark resemblance to the Christian parables of salvation to come later - an irrelevant 
(?) consideration) if two conditions are met: ( 1) if it persuades (Glaucon may not be the only person other 
than Socrates who must be persuaded - the Republic is the other tale and its target is not Glaucon, though 
some of the people who read it will be like Glaucon); in any event, the notion of persuasion or belief is 
critical and distinct from merely following a rule or the will of authority; and (2) the river Lethe is crossed 
'well' - prudence governs the intake of a amnesia-inducing water of the Lethe. In other words, the 
teachings must be remembered. One must remember the 'truth' ofa past life, but not all of it(!) One must 
drink some of the river Lethe and therefore forget something - willfully not living reality or the truth 
(inauthentic existence) is very Heideggerian. To admit to a radically perspectival existence without any 
'truth' in an objective sense and moving toward death is an uprooting and frightful admission. 
XXXVl Kevin O'Neill informed me of the Greek meaning of 'Cephalus'. 
xxxvii The manner in which Cephalus greets Socrates is one that betrays a great deal of desire for 
interaction. Cephalus may not wholly desire that Socrates ignore him and deal with the younger people 
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present; of course Cephalus may recognize that Socrates cannot really ignore him because of his position 
in the household and his position at the outset of conversation: seated in a cushioned stool with a circle of 
stools around it. 
xxxviii Cephalus' original argument included a notion of piety, that reckoning one's debts with the gods to 
incur their favor was also ideal. Socrates leaves this pious aspect out his restatement of Cephalus' claims. 
Although the reason Socrates did this is unclear, the power of the dialogue to shape the argument is 
demonstrated - a potentially significant aspect of Cephalus' statement is swept away and the argument 
leaves it behind. 
""""' Art, as used by Plato, is not the same as it is used in contemporary English. Allan Bloom's 22°d 
endnote (found on page 443) to the translation of Book I explains: 
The Greek word is techn e, from which the English words "technical" and "technique" 
are derived. It does not mean art in the present-day sense, but rather in the older sense 
implied, for example, by the word artisan. It means a discipline operating on the basis 
of principles that can be taught. It is, hence, not opposed to opposed to science but 
allied with it, and in Plato the terms "art" and "science" are often indistinguishable; an 
art is always a model of what is rational and intelligible. 
The linkage between science and art is significant since Socrates is rendering justice analogous to some 
sort of art in his criticism of Polemarchus, suggesting a tie between science and justice. The criticism of 
Polemarchus' interpretation of justice through analogy with the arts is that while the arts do what is good 
for an object, justice must do good to humans (and, at this point, bad to enemies). The sort of knowledge 
required for the arts is different from the knowledge required for Polemarchus' conception of justice. 
x1 This problem extends beyond the particular case of conflicting beliefs in virtue and justice because 
Socrates' technique and argument do not (at least not yet) identify how to make judgments between 
different principles. 
xii Perhaps the rationale behind the philosopher's choice of which opinion to 'hide' in the dialectic and 
which to criticize is survival. As the next endnote indicates, the relationship between the positivist and 
the philosopher is not particularly friendly. 
xiii Furious indeed; Thrasymachus burst into the discussion in such a manner as to incite animal 
references. Socrates even believed that Thrasymachus would have killed him had Socrates not seen 
Thrasyrnachus first. The text reads that Thrasyrnachus would have rendered Socrates 'speechless', yet a 
cross-reference to The Symposium suggests that life and speech are integrally related for Socrates. 
Consider the ascent to contemplation of absolute beauty was both taught through speech (by Diotima) and 
is realized through speech. In addition, what could philosophy do if the capacity for speech is taken away; 
so far the philosopher only persuades through the dialectic. Further, Socrates does not philosophize the 
same way as those who came before him and examined nature, rather he spends his days talking with 
people at the market and working with their opinions orally . .. isn't the silence of Socrates what Athens 
desired. Unlike Socrates, the sophist does not live in speech, but makes a living through speech. 
Also of note: the relationship between philosophy (Socrates) and authority (Thrasymachus is 
starkly associated with the city and rulers in two ways which are handled shortly in the text proper, not 
the notes) is a hostile one, perhaps to the point of mortality. This mortal struggle may ground the 
judgment for which belief is hidden in the dialectic and which receives scrutiny. 
If philosophy functions by persuading people using immanent beliefs as opposed to an external 
standard, it cannot lodge positive claims of its own, but merely critique existing beliefs. This activity 
requires a certain level of secrecy - if the philosopher is forced to speak in a wholly positive fashion the 
technique may not function. Thrasymachus tries this approach but does not follow it through - partially 
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because Socrates is incredibly resistant and refuses more than once, but largely because Thrasymachus 
wants to speak and show his skill and 'knowledge'. While this desire is clear in the Republic's text, the 
reason for Thrasymachus' desire to profess his knowledge is not. Allan Bloom's explanation from the 
"Interpretive Essay" at the end of his translation of the Republic indicates Thrasymachus had come to 
Athens and sought employment. Thrasymachus' job is sophistry - teaching rhetoric and receiving 
payment for the instruction. Since Thrasymachus needs students, he is compelled to speak. 
xliii The setting in which Thrasymachus agrees to speak and allow Socrates to question is strikingly similar 
to the trial scene in The Apology in two ways: (1) following Athenian legal custom, Thrasymachus asks 
Socrates (the accused) to plead a certain punishment to which Socrates replies he has no money; and (2) 
Socrates friends agree to pay for Socrates. The significance of this similarity is the linkage between 
Thrasymachus and authority or the City; Thrasymachus represents it. 
Allan Bloom adds the suggestion that Plato is implicitly defending Socrates from the jury be 
portraying him as ignorant of the judicial process while his opponent is well versed in that art. 
xliv Consider: Leo Strauss, On Tyranny, revised and expanded edition, eds. Victor Gourevitch & Michael 
S. Roth (New York: The Free Press, Macmillan, Inc., 1991), in which Simonides persuades(?) Hiero to 
engage in rule which benefits the ruled, though the rule is still toward Heiro's advantage. Socrates seems 
to have accomplished a similar feat since Thrasymachus ads this aspect of benefiting the ruled (though in 
a mild form) to his original claim; while Thrasyumachus began by claiming that justice is only the 
advantage of the stronger, he seems to say that justice is the advantage of the stronger, though the 
advantage of the stronger tends to benefit the ruled. 
xiv Leo Strauss, in his essay on Plato [in The History of Political Philosophy, 2nd edition, eds. Leo Strauss 
& Joseph Crospey (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1972), 16] explains this turn to city founding to 
explain why justice is better than injustice as follows: 
In order to defend the cause of justice, Socrates turns to founding, together with 
Glaukon and Adeimantos, a city in speech. The reason why this procedure is necessary 
can be stated as follows. Justice is believed to be law-abidingness or the firm will to 
give everyone what belongs to him, i.e., what belongs to him according to law; yet 
justice is also believed to be good or salutary; but obedience to law is not unqualifiedly 
salutary because the laws may be bad; justice will be simply salutary only when the laws 
are good, and this requires that the regime from which the laws flow is good: justice will 
be fully salutary only in a good city. Socrates' procedure further implies he knew of no 
actual city which is good; this is the reason why he is compelled to found a good city. 
He justifies his turning to the city by the consideration that justice can be detected more 
easily in the city than in the human individual because the former is larger than the 
latter; he thus implies that there is a parallelism between the city and the human 
individual, or, more precisely, between the city and the soul of the human individual. 
[Strauss continues by elaborating the parallelism between the human soul and the city.] 
At first glance, the interpretation and explanation from Strauss seems in conflict with the analysis offered 
in the text prior to this endnote. If taken at face value, Strauss explains the use of the city to address the 
issue of whether the just is better than the unjust because Socrates must incorporate the belief that justice 
is salutary into his analysis. While this is true, it isn't at all clear why Socrates couldn't merely insert 
some good laws (which would therefore be salutary) into an existing city. The only difference between 
constructing a city and inserting laws is that in the former Socrates et. al. would be rulers (the stronger), 
while in the latter they would be criticizing citizens (an illegitimate act under positivism). On face, the 
Strauss interpretation is partially correct - Socrates must address the belief that justice is salutary - but is 
insufficient to explain Socrates' turn to the city rather than make a law. 
Strauss may only intend this explanation as a superficial account, however, because of the 
language which precedes it: "The reason why this procedure [turning to the city] is necessary can be stated 
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as follows." Strauss is usually very precise in his language, and does not use the expression "can be 
stated" in any other section. If the language is taken precisely, the explanation of Socrates' procedure 
could be stated as Strauss did, but this is not necessarily the correct statement. Strauss' statement, ifread 
carefully, gives certain clues that he was aware Plato was, in a sense, conceding positivism: (1) the claim 
that Socrates knew ofno good city; and (2) that the salutary element of justice is only realizable through 
the laws. The first clue indicates Strauss' awareness of positivism because it implies either Socrates knew 
the good and no city met that standard, or Socrates didn't know the good, as Socrates himself professes at 
the end of "Book f'. If Socrates knew the good, however, he could make just laws without being the 
stronger (or ruler) since he would have a higher standard (goodness) to which he could appeal; Strauss 
probably knew this and included the clue in his statement intentionally. The second clue is perhaps even 
more compelling: Strauss implies that, for Socrates, justice is salutary only if applied through the laws. 
This is very curious because, if humans have a natural dignity, then the salutariness of justice could be 
realized without convention (the laws). Implicitly, since the salutary effect of justice is only realizable 
through convention, justice cannot naturally exist. This constitutes a collapse between the distinction 
between the just and the legal - which is positivism. Indeed, Strauss performs this very collapse (see the 
block quote above starting with the word 'yet; on line four and ending with the word 'bad' on line six.) 
when he slips the discussion from 'justice' to 'obedience to the laws' . Ironically, this move is very 
platonic because the explanation is very dialectical (notice all the semicolons - it goes back and forth) and 
Strauss hides the belief he wants to preserve in that dialectic. 
Strauss' interpretation, whether insufficient, or sufficient but disguised, makes a useful 
observation: Socrates wishes to keep the belief that good laws are salutary laws. This observation is useful 
because it offers the foundation for an example of Socrates' consistency: much like Socrates did with 
Polemarchus, he hides that belief (viz., that good laws are salutary laws) in the dialectic as a requirement 
for other considerations of justice when talking with Glaucon. 
xlvi The two reasons given in the text above, viz., Socrates admits he hasn't answered Thrasymachus' 
articulation of the just, and that he resorts to being 'the stronger' in order to defend his position is joined 
by a third reason from Leo Strauss' {op. cit. in note 36]: Socrates allows Polemarchus to drop part of 
Cephalus' notion about justice, i.e., truth telling is just. The notion of the lie beingjust or noble is thus 
introduced. Therefore, Socrates and Plato can deceive (pretend absolute standards, objective knowledge, 
or 'forms', exist). 
xlvii And the theory of forms, etc .. . 
xiviu Relativism was not an issue for Aquinas - faith both provided knowledge and guaranteed the 
reliability of reason and experience of nature: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part I, 2nd edition, 
ed. Mortimer J. Adler, trans. Father Laurence Shapcote (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1991) 3-
7. 
xlix The manner in which Aquinas' Summa Theologica is generally cited is by Part ('w') of Book ('x'), 
Question ('y') and Article ('z'), such that the citation looks like: Aquinas w-x, y, z. This method was not 
used for this essay because the method of citation for normal texts is more clear. 
1 St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., page 163, footnote omitted. 
The term ' quiditty', according to The Random House Unabridged Dictionary. (2nd edition (New York: 
Random House, 1993), definition 1) means "[T]he quality that makes a thing what it is; the essential 
nature of a thing." 
Ji St. Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., page 427, footnote omitted. 
1
" St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part II, 2nd edition, ed. Mortimer J. Adler, trans. Father 
Laurence Shapcote (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1991) 222. 
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liii This clear phrasing of John Austin's major point [excepts from The Province of Jurisprudence 
Detennined in The Nature of Law, ed. M.P. Golding (New York: Random House, 1966)] is borrowed 
from Thomas E. Davitt in Origins of the Natural Law Tradition, ed. Arthur L. Harding (New York: 
Kennikat Press, 1971) 28. 
!iv St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part II, 2nd edition, ed. Mortimer J. Adler, trans. Father 
Laurence Shapcote (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1991) 687. 
Iv Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., page 214. 
lvi Thomas Aquinas, op. cit., page 217. Interestingly, Aquinas waxes platonic in his examples and 
position when the issue of positive law is addressed. Consider the reference to arts, the salutary 
requirement of justice, and that each regime is good in a particular sense. 
lvii In the case of the ruler who legislates for his own benefit, the reason is not 'right' - he knows what his 
natural inclinations are, but does not attempt to satisfy them in the ruled. 
tviii I have omitted an explicit reference to Aquinas' claim that the natural law is eternal; since nature is 
determinate for humans, so long as humans are humans their nature will be the same. Since natural law 
is the product of human inclinations rooted in human nature, the law is necessarily static. Human positive 
law's attempts to realize the natural law are, of course, always changing. 
tix Therefore its can legitimately claim, even under a positivistic understanding of the law, that its decrees 
are of greater legitimacy. 
1x In other words, the natural law dictates the area of need or desire which a human positive law should 
address. 
00 The beliefin God, perhaps because of the nature of God, is probably not subject to proof. Faith is, by 
definition, not exactly the product of experience, and to believe in a proven God is not an act of faith, it is 
an acceptance of reality. 
!xii The first edition of Immanuel Kant, Kant: Political Writings, Hans Reiss, ed., H.B, Nisbet, trans., 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) was published in 1970. Briefly thereafter a couple texts which 
relied heavily on Kant arose. John Rawls ' A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
Belknap Press, 1971) explicitly states an indebtedness to Kant, see page viii. 
!xiii Hume's claim, briefly, is that experience demonstrates that things humans consider cause and effect 
(his terms is 'necessary connection') are only 'constantly contiguous. In other words, humans experience 
one event followed by a second event which is contiguous. Humans do not experience a sensation of 
causation however, nor do they have experience of the future such that they can be certain that a particular 
set of contiguous events will be duplicated in the future. This means that certain events witnessed in a 
scientific experiment are believable for that experiment only and cannot be expected to work again 
because experience offers no justification for that belief. 
!xiv Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, unabridged edition, Norman Kemp Smith, trans. (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1965), 22-23. 
1xv Kant's a priori rules are still positivistic since they implicitly hold a position of authority greater than 
the laws of a state. 
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!xvi Immanuel Kant, On the Common Saving: 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in 
Practice', in Kant Political Writings, 2nd, enlarged edition, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H.B. Nisbet 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) 73-4. 
!xvii Ibid., 74. 
!xviii Ibid., 14. 
!xix Kant's categorical imperative is a set of principles which command a duty or behavior. For example, 
one of the imperatives is that one has a duty to not perform deeds which, if universalized, would render 
one unable to perform the deed again. Less abstractly, things like cutting in line are not good because, 
were everyone to cut in line, the line would never get anywhere. 
1xx I am indebted to Dr. Kevin O'Neill for relating the rejection of the Garden of Eden to the rejection of 
religion generally. The arguments claiming the prohibition against eating the fruit from the tree of 
knowledge constitutes law, etc. are original. 
lxxi The Holy Bible, New International Version, University edition (Colorado Spring, CO: International 
Bible Society) "Genesis 3: 1-12. 
lxxii This example based on the steam governor is borrowed from Tim van Gelder, "What Might Cognition 
Be If Not Computation'', Journal of Philosophy, (July 1995): 347-358. 
Ixxiii An algorithm is a set of procedures which, if successful would perform a function or, if unsuccessful, 
indicate the function is impossible. 
lxxiv John R. Searle, "Minds, Brains, and Programs," The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1980): 416-24, 
reprinted in The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, ed. Margaret Boden (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1990) 67-87. 
This piece is a landmark work in Artificial Intelligence (and the philosophy of mind, generally) and 
makes a remarkably insightful argument against any conception of the mind as a computational machine; 
computation in the sense of something which applies formal rules to inputs. 
1xxv Ibid., 68-72. 
Ixxvi William Bechtel, "Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind: An Overview," The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy (supp. 26, 1987): 17. 
lxxvii Paul and Patricia Churchland, "Could a Machine Think," Scientific American (January, 1990): 36-7. 
Ixxviii Cross-reference this with the account of the 'there' present in the endnote on Heidegger. Heidegger's 
account of meaning and contemporary cognitive science are startlingly similar. 
lxxix William Bechtel, "The Case for Connectionism," Philosophical Studies 71(August1993): 142. 
1xxx Ibid., 150. 
lxxx.i Present connectionist machines such as those employed by the military can recognize tanks in tress at 
different levels of ambient light. They cannot, however, do much more than recognize a few hundred 
patterns per system, though the recognition level increases significantly for every few nodes added. 
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lxxxii Though the grounding of the judgments/principles would be from inclinations similar to Aquinas'; 
natural human tendencies would detennine meaning and significance for the system, and therefore its 
judgments. 
lxxxiii SSR (Surface Spectral Reflectance) by objects of sensation seem to be the same from human to 
human, so the sensations seem to be the same, and human responses to the sensation before they enter the 
nervous system seem to be the same. The sensations (patterns of neural activity) vary from human to 
human because humans have varying connection strengths between their own neurons/synapses. See 
James McGilvray, "Constant Colors in the Head'', Svnthese 100 (1994): 197-239. 
lxxxiv Into what Heidegger might call the 'idle talk'; the substrate beliefs of society which are accepted and 
propagated without reflection. See op. cit. page 221. 
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